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1
Introduction

In February of 2013, President Barack Obama announced the United States would pursue
a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union. In his State of the
Union Address Obama said “we will launch talks on the comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership with the European Union, because trade that is fair and free across the
Atlantic supports millions of good paying American jobs.”1 This announcement received
statements of support from governments and non-governmental actors around the globe who
would be significantly impacted by the success of the partnership. This agreement would
directly benefit industries such as the automotive industry and finally allow them to trade freely
between the two largest marketplaces in the global economy. As one business leader said,
businesses now are responsible with providing both the United States and the European Union
with as much information on regulations as possible. This will make it easier for the
governments to work with businesses to achieve the best possible outcome.2 President Obama’s
announcement and the reaction of multinational corporations in both political units illustrate the
importance of multinational corporations’ relationships with governments around the world,
which begs the question, who truly has a hand in making foreign policy?
The typical decision-makers of international negotiations include the head of state, close
advisors and other governmental agencies; but who are the other actors that operate behind the
scenes? This study focuses on the impact of multinational corporations, which have branches
around the world and are often headquartered in advanced industrialized countries, on
international negotiations. I seek to determine if MNCs will attempt to influence international
negotiation outcomes in both their home and host countries. Specifically, I examine
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international trade negotiations pertaining to the automotive industry in the United States and the
European Union. This research should yield significant insight into the relationship between a
MNC and its home and host country. To conduct this research, I will develop a multi-leveled
theoretical model based on theoretical literature. I will then apply this theoretical model to the
cases examined in this study. Multi-level and two-level models are discussed throughout the
academic literature by scholars including Robert D. Putnam and Jeffrey W. Knopf.3
Scholarly literature highlights multiple methods to influence the outcome of international
negotiations. I will build on Putnam’s two-level game theory, which claims there are two levels
active in international negotiations—Level I, or the international level, and Level II or the
domestic level. Putnam claims a move at one level cannot be made without a resulting move
occurring at the other level; the two levels are intrinsically linked. Putnam discusses how, at the
domestic level, actors such as MNCs, interest groups and lobbies, will pressure for a preferred
policy outcome. Meanwhile, at the international level, governments seek to maximize their
countries gains and satisfy the domestic actors. Since the theory’s introduction in 1988, twolevel game theory has been analyzed, critiqued and expanded upon throughout academic
literature. Jeffrey Knopf uses two-level game theory as the basis for his theoretical approach to
international negotiations: the three-and-three theoretical framework. Domestic structure theory
is developed by Peter Gourevitch and Peter Katzenstein.4 This theory analyzes the structure of a
state and determines if it a strong or weak state. The domestic structure of a state offers a
theoretical explanation for external influence of actors on political decision-making. These
theoretical frameworks are the basis for the theoretical model I develop and present in Chapter
Two. Game theoretic models of international negotiations and domestic structure theory provide
an applicable theoretical framework to analyze the relationship between actors in international
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negotiations. Ultimately I will use the theoretical model developed to determine if a MNC
influences the outcomes of international trade negotiations.
This study employs the comparative case study method to examine MNCs’ influence on
U.S. and European trade negotiations. This method will determine if MNCs influence
international trade negotiations, how they do so and if they are more successful in their home or
host country. In order to conduct a comparative case study on this topic I will use primary and
secondary sources as my data sources. Primary sources will include original information about
the MNCs present at the negotiations and information pertaining to the trade negotiations and the
outcomes. Secondary sources will consist of theoretical and academic literature on theoretical
approaches and previous means of political influence. I will also collect information from
interviews with officials at MNCs that operate in the United States and European Union. This
research method will add a current voice to the research I will gather for my cases. Once the
data is collected, I will analyze my findings in order to determine if there are any visible patterns.
The first case I will examine is the 2005 Summit in Washington D.C. between the United
States and the European Union. Specifically, I will look at the negotiations on the potential
harmonization of divergent regulations between the United States and the European Union into
one set of regulations. The second case study I will examine regards the collaborative research
and the negotiations between the United States and the European Union in 1997. The objective
of these negotiations was the hope of producing one harmonized safety regulation that would
benefit both states and their constituents. After presenting these cases, I will conduct an analysis
using the theoretical model and present the common patterns found in the results. This will
allow me to answer the questions and hypotheses of my study. However, before developing the
cases, a firm understanding of the existing theoretical literature on this topic is required.
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Chapter 1: Theory and Literature Review

There are many theoretical approaches to understanding international negotiations, and
each theory appears to offer a new approach to understanding the multifaceted and complex
process. In order to analyze the relationship between multinational corporations and their home
and host governments in regards to foreign policy, it is important to understand the broad scope
of theories applicable. Many of the theoretical models I examine in this chapter maintain roots
in the realist school of thought. Therefore, I will first discuss realism and its views of
international negotiations; second, I introduce literature on game theory. Last, I will introduce
the various ways game theory has been built upon in order to make it more applicable to real
international negotiations.
All major theoretical schools of thought can be applied to the analysis of international
negotiations: realism, liberalism and constructivism; and each theoretical school of thought will
emphasize a different outcome in international negotiations. Realism is the theoretical school of
thought which is most prominent. Liberalism places an emphasis upon the individuals in
international negotiations as well as the importance of the domestic arena in the outcomes of
international negotiations. The noted scholars of liberalism, such as Immanuel Kant, John Stuart
Mill and Woodrow Wilson, stress, “in democratic polities, foreign policies, like internal policies
are subject to domestic debate and deliberation.”5 Furthermore, liberals emphasize that
interdependence among states is the best way to ensure national security. Constructivism places
emphasis on the governmental structures of the regimes involved in the international negotiations
and how the different structures can influence the outcomes of international negotiations. The
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assumptions made by liberalism and constructivism are both vastly different from the
assumptions of realism.

Realism and International Negotiations
Realism is one of the oldest theoretical approaches in international relations, dating back
to the works of Thucydides and Machiavelli.6 Realism operates under the assumptions that the
world is anarchic, states are the most important actor, states are unitary rational actors, and states
engage in cost benefit analysis in order to determine the best means to pursue power and
reinforce their security. These assumptions are central to determining how a realist will view
and interpret phenomena such as international negotiations.

When realism is applied to

international negotiations it is highly focused on the international stage and the ways in which
states interact with one another.
However, Robert Jervis and Andrew Moravcsik critique realism and its approach to the
analysis of international negotiations. In Jervis’ 1988 discussion on realism and game theory, he
points out the fundamental flaws in using only realism as a means to analyze international
negotiations.7 Jervis’ first criticism of the realist approach to international negotiations is how
the assumption of anarchy, “looks at individual actors [states], their preferences, and their
choices, and thus blinds us to the broader setting in which behavior occurs.”8 Jervis goes on to
add two more objections to what he calls the “anarchic framework”: the concepts the anarchy
framework applies to the actors in question and the perceptions and views of the actors in
question.9
Moravcsik outlines one of the largest issues facing a realist interpretation of international
negotiations: the lack of a theoretical model to analyze international negotiations.10 Realist
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scholars were aware of the area of overlap between the domestic and international arenas: “as the
classical Realists were already aware, the effects of domestic factors are not limited to the
process of interest formation, but affect strategy and bargaining outcomes as well.”11 However,
there was still a lack of a theoretical means to approach this grey area. Therefore a new way to
analyze international negotiations was welcomed by realist scholars. Moravcsik presents the
three key assumptions of realism: rationality, constant mobilization capability and state stability;
he claims these assumptions should be relaxed in an analysis of international negotiations.12 By
relaxing these assumptions, he contends realism could become more applicable to the analysis of
international negotiations.
Kenneth Waltz offered new insights to a realist analysis of international negotiations with
the introduction of the levels of analysis model in the 1950s.13 The three levels of analysis
consist of the international level (or systemic), the domestic level (or state) and the individual
level.14 Each level of analysis provides scholars with a different way to analyze international
negotiations. The systems level of analysis allows scholars to look at the relations between two
states and view the ‘big picture’ of what is occurring on the international playing field. The state
level of analysis focuses specifically on the domestic arena of international negotiations,
providing scholars with a more specific analysis of potential reasons behind international
negotiations’ outcomes. Lastly, the individual level of analysis is the most focused level of
analysis and provides scholars with a close analysis of any individuals involved in international
negotiations. Waltz’s levels of analysis allow realist scholars to view international negotiations
through three different lenses. Each lens provides a different view of international negotiations,
offering a rich way to analyze them. Furthermore, levels of analysis illustrate that international
negotiations can be interpreted at the international, national and individual levels, showing large
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overlaps throughout these three vastly different levels. The introduction of Waltz’s levels of
analysis was a vital first step towards further theoretical approaches to the study of international
negotiations.

Game Theory
Game theory is a realist approach to the study of international relations that arose during
the Cold War. Robert Jervis and Peter Bennett both discuss game theory as a vital step in the
evolution of theoretical frameworks applicable to international negotiations. They exhibit the
importance of game theory through applications to international relations in their respective
studies.15 Bennett claims, “game theory began as a normative theory, the aim being to show how
rational players should act.”16 Game theory does not mean the actors in question are going to
‘play’ one another as the terminology might suggest. Rather, as Bennett states, “a game in this
sense is simply a situation in which there are two or more parties who can affect what happens,
all of whom are pursuing their separate aims.”17 Game theory applies realist assumptions in its
framework; such as the state is the most important actor and it is a unitary rational actor:
“recommended strategies are only rational ways of playing against an equally rational
opponent.”18 Game theory’s heavy dependence on realist assumptions in the creation of its
theoretical framework causes the two often to go hand in hand when discussing their application
to international negotiations. Jervis states: “Game theory and Realism are generally
compatible—both are structural, strategic, and rational.”19
International relations and the study of international negotiations can be seen as a maze of
decisions made incorporating a variety of factors. Just as many theoretical approaches, “game
models are intended to provide an analytic guide through this maze.”20 Game theory is based on
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strategy, where a “strategy is a complete recipe of actions.”21 It simply seeks to analyze the
potential decisions that a state may make based on the potential decisions the other state may
make. Both Jervis and Bennett discuss another way states make their decisions in regards to
international negotiations: the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a means to
analyze the potential advantages and disadvantages at play in negotiations. Jervis utilizes the
theoretical framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to interpret the reasoning behind decisions
made throughout international negotiations.
However, even though Jervis and Bennett discuss the importance and benefits game
theory provides the study of international negotiations, they also criticize the flaws of this
theoretical approach. The resounding criticism of game theory from these authors is it is not
realistic enough to be truly applicable to the international negotiations; Bennett states, “mixed
motive games are much closer to the real world of partial conflict…In these games, convincing
normative solutions are more difficult to find. This has led to different ways of interpreting the
theory, affecting the types of conclusions drawn.”22 Jervis also argues that game theory does not
account for enough external factors in order for it to be fully applicable. Yet, even though game
theory has its flaws, it marked the beginning of theoretical developments in international
relations. Out of game theory, further theoretical approaches to the study of international
negotiations began to evolve throughout the latter half of the 20th century.

Two Levels of Analysis
In 1988, Robert Putnam introduced the revolutionary idea of “two-level game theory” to
analyze foreign policy decision-making related to international negotiations. Previous to
Putnam’s theory, scholars had drawn a correlation between domestic influences and international
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negotiation outcomes, however a framework for in depth analysis of international negotiations
was still lacking. There are faults with realism, just as with any theory. Putnam utilized these
faults in the creation of his two-level game theory.23 Many realist theorists designated domestic
politics as a secondary form of influence in international negotiations, and did not give them
their due in an analysis. For example Robert Keohane, a noted realist scholar, “maintains that
international explanations should serve as the “first cut” of any analysis…In this view domestic
politics is an intervening variable that introduces residual variance around the predictions of
systemic theory.”24 Putnam introduced a revolutionary theoretical approach that accounted for
both the domestic and international levels as equally important, clashing with this dominant
approach where the domestic and international arenas are clearly separate.
In his article, Putnam proposed two-level game theory and claimed it provided a new
theoretical framework for analyzing international negotiations.25 Putnam used the assumptions
of realism and two-level game theory as a means to illustrate how international negotiations are
conducted on two different levels or tables simultaneously. Two-level game theory assumes, “at
the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt
favorable policies…At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign
developments.”26 A variety of different actors sit at the two different tables described by
Putnam. The leader of the state sits at both the national and the international tables and must try
to appease both the national and international games with the final negotiation outcome. Seated
at the international table alongside the leader of the state are any diplomats and other
international advisors. 27 At the national or domestic table are “party and parliamentary figures,
spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups, and the leader’s own
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political advisors.”28 Throughout Putnam’s article, he reinforces how a move made at one table
cannot be made without calculations from the other table—this is the complicated task of the
lead negotiator (often times the head of state). In essence, a move at one level will cause a move
at the other; the two playing boards are intricately connected with one another.
The second aspect Putnam highlights in his article on two-level games are “win-sets”.
Win-sets are the possible negotiation outcomes where both the national and international tables
are appeased by the result. Putnam breaks down international negotiations into two different
levels to help in the analysis of the negotiations, the first level being the “bargaining between the
negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement; call that Level I and separate discussions within
each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement; call that Level II.”29 Therefore
according to Putnam, “we may define the “win-set” for a given Level II constituency as the set of
all possible Level I agreements that would “win”.”30 There are a variety of factors that go into
determining the win-sets in the two-level game theory, including specific individuals, coalitions,
institutions and bureaucracies, the ideology of the states in question, the regime types and the
preferences of all parties involved.
The magnitude of a win-set at the domestic level is often times highly influenced by a
variety of non-governmental actors. These actors can include multinational corporations, labor
unions, and industrial and business lobbies. Some Level I negotiators may find these actors to be
allies in their attempts to get a solution ratified by Level II. Each of these actors can exert
influence and pressure level II towards they solution they wish to see. Putnam presents us with
an example:
“The Level I negotiator may find silent allies at his opponent’s domestic table.
German labor unions might welcome foreign pressure on their own government
to adopt a more expansive fiscal policy, and Italian bankers might welcome
international demands for a more austere Italian monetary policy. Thus,
transnational alignments may emerge, tacit or explicit, in which domestic
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interests pressure their respective governments to adopt mutually supportive
policies.”31

These non-governmental actors present at the domestic table are important actors to take
into account when analyzing international negotiations. They influence the size of the win-set in
international negotiations and therefore can determine the final outcome of the international
negotiations.

Application of Two-Level Game Theory
Putnam’s two-level game theory was used in numerous case studies after its introduction
in 1988. Each case study used Putnam’s theoretical framework in a different manner, and with
each application different attributes of international negotiations were discovered. These
applications of two-level game theory illustrate how the theory can be put into practice and are
therefore crucial aspects in understanding the theory to its full extent. Furthermore, several case
studies in which two-level game theory was used, resulted in a spinoff of two-level game theory
into a similar, yet different theoretical approach.
Ellis Krauss used Putnam’s two-level game theory in his case study on trade
negotiations.32 Krauss acknowledged the importance of the two-level game theory, especially in
his analysis of the U.S.-Japan trade negotiations. The trade negotiations examined by Krauss
pertain to the semiconductor industry, the construction industry and the economic links between
Japan and the United States.33 In the semiconductor case, the United States accused the Japanese
of dumping semiconductors in their market at unfair market values. There were also charges
against Japan that it was not enabling access to its domestic market by foreign competitors.34 In
the construction trade negotiation case, the United States wanted more access to the Japanese
domestic construction market, which consisted of many private firms and government
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partnerships for public works. These negotiations were triggered because of a dispute over an
airport’s construction.35 Both of Krauss’ cases highlight the importance of domestic actors
situated at the domestic negotiation table.36 He points out that, “domestic interest groups need
not be merely “ratifiers or nonratifiers”—a static element in the win-set equation that COGs
manipulate to gain a stable agreement. Manipulation extends two ways, for domestic interest
groups are also capable of strategic action to mold win-sets.”37 Krauss concludes by determining
that an extension of the two-level game theory may be needed and its application to these two
cases illustrated interesting aspects about domestic actors and the international table.38
In the semiconductor case, the importance of U.S. and Japanese semiconductor firms
were paramount throughout the negotiations.39 In the United States, trade negotiations with
Japan would never have begun had it not been for the pressure of the semiconductor industry on
Congress.40 The industry lobbied Congress significantly to act on their behalf. The
semiconductor industry’s voice was strengthened by the numerous dumping suits filed against
Japan. Second, the semiconductor industry was unified in their objective for the final policy
outcome through its representation by the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), consisting
of a variety of firms including IBM.41 The unity of the industry allowed for the U.S. side of the
trade negotiations to be highly unified on its desired outcome of trade negotiations with Japan.42
Third, because the U.S. side of the negotiations was so unified, the acceptable win-sets for the
domestic actors were a few specific options. This made the objective of the international trade
negotiations clear for U.S. negotiators.43 In Japan however, the semiconductor industry was
oligopolistic, consisting of firms such as Toshiba and Hitachi and it was also split. Japan was
also led by a powerful bureaucratic actor: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI).44 The split of the domestic Japanese industry and the powerful actor of MITI caused
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there to be conflict between the government and the industry within the domestic level of the
Japanese side.45 The division within Japan posed many problems for the country throughout the
negotiations.
In the construction trade negotiations between the United States and Japan, just as in the
semiconductor case, large firms were present throughout the negotiations. In the United States,
the firms were split between the large multinational firms seeking to enter the Japanese market
and the smaller firms being represented by the International Engineering and Construction
Industry Council (IECIC).46 Furthermore, in the construction negotiations three bureaucracies
were vital on the U.S. side: the Commerce Department, the U.S. Trade Representative and the
State Department.47 The variety of actors and the split between the various firms caused the U.S.
win-set to be more complex and obscured the ultimate objective. Furthermore, it was a push by
the U.S. bureaucracy that launched the trade negotiations with Japan.48 In Japan, the relationship
between the construction industry and its leading firms and the government was very close, due
to both public and semi-public projects.49 The Japanese construction industry was well
organized into trade associations and had substantial political influence. Due to its close ties
with the government, the Japanese firms were represented through the three powerful
bureaucracies present at the domestic level: the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of
Transportation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.50
Both of the cases examined by Krauss illustrate the importance of domestic actors in
international negotiations. The domestic actors in both the semiconductor case and the
construction case triggered the international negotiations. Furthermore, in both cases the
domestic actors determined the win-set and the level of complexity of the domestic negotiating
table, which in turn determined the complexity of the international negotiating table. Krauss
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concludes his study on trade negotiations by stating, “we must not think that only governments
play at both levels. With the increasing interdependence of economies, major interest groups
often have international interests, and may also make moves at an international table.”51 This is
vital to remember as we proceed through other literature that use aspects of Putnam’s two-level
game theory in creating new theoretical approaches to the study of international negotiations.
Similar to in Krauss’ case study, Helen Milner examines international negotiations
between Great Britain and the United States in two specific cases.52 The two cases Milner
explores with the two-level game framework pertain to oil negotiations and civil aviation
negotiations. The oil negotiations between Britain and the United States failed, while the civil
aviation negotiations were successful. Milner argues the difference between the two cases was
the domestic negotiating table.53
In the oil negotiations between the United States and Great Britain, the U.S. oil industry
was divided between major firms and domestic firms. The major firms were based in the United
States and had holdings in the rich oil land in the Middle East, such as Standard Oil of New
Jersey (SONJ) and Socony-Vacuum.54 These major firms could control prices, and eventually
would negotiate their own agreements over land rights in the Middle East. The domestic firms,
which produced oil found in the United States, were smaller, could not control prices without
government help and relied on the government for other aspects of their production. Another
distinguishing factor between the two groups was, “the two groups had different channels of
access to the U.S. government.”55 The large firms had better access to the executive branch,
while the domestic firms worked more closely with their Congressional representatives. Milner
found that who each actor has access to and who they could influence, played a significant factor
in determining their level of influence on negotiation outcomes. The U.S. government saw an
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advantage to helping the large industries—to exploit Middle Eastern resources and preserve the
domestic oil reserves.56 On the British side of the negotiations, the domestic table was less
divided, with two oil firms represented: Royal-Dutch-Shell and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(AIOC). The British government did not have to choose a side to support, uniting them in their
pursuit of a cooperative solution to the negotiations.57 The oil negotiations became difficult
when the U.S. side lost sight of what the oil industry wanted and the divisions within the
domestic level became greater. U.S. domestic oil producers impeded oil negotiations further
through their pressure on Congress because of their dissatisfaction in the potential outcome. The
disintegration of the U.S. domestic negotiating table caused the oil negotiations to fail.
However, an agreement was reached between the U.S. major firms and the British firms later
on—illustrating the power of these actors within and outside of governmental trade negotiations.
The second case Milner discusses is on civilian aviation negotiations. This case was
dominated by the presence of one U.S. civil aviation firm—Pan American Airways (PAA).58
PAA had previously negotiated its own air rights since it had a monopoly on civil aviation
almost everywhere on the globe. However, PAA ran into a road block when it sought to make
air routes over the Atlantic to Europe—specifically with Britain. This road block caused the
civil aviation negotiations to begin.
PAA’s monopoly on civil aviation gave them very close relations with the U.S.
government—especially with certain Congressional representatives and Senators.59 However,
the relationship with the government at large became strained over time, to the point where the
Civil Aeronautics Board sought to put an end to PAA’s monopoly; this resulted in a battle on the
domestic level between allies of PAA and allies of the other civil aviation companies.60
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This internal division shaped the position of the United States in the international
negotiations significantly. It determined the win-set for the U.S. domestic level. The British
side was composed of one civil aviation firm: BOAC, which was still governmentally owned.61
Unlike the complex U.S. domestic level, the British domestic level was simple and unified in
what it sought out of the international negotiations with the United States. Britain wanted to
promote competition in civil international aviation as a part of its foreign and economic policy.
An interesting issue that arose throughout the negotiations, was that the PAA and the BOAC
both sought the same resolution—and attempted to complete it through a secret cartel—however
what the two dominant firms wanted out of the international negotiations did not coincide with
the desires of either government.62 The international negotiations came to a successful
agreement in the end, after negotiations were readdressed out of consideration for the two
countries alliance.63
Through the application of two-level game theory to both of these cases of international
negotiations, Milner’s analysis discovers the importance of international conditions in
international negotiations.64 However, she also found the structure of domestic preferences was
crucial in determining the outcome of international negotiations.65 This was the aspect that
differed between the two cases Milner analyzed. In the oil negotiations, the domestic
preferences—especially in the United States—were torn between different parties. However, in
the civil aviation negotiations, the domestic preferences were unified in the pursuit of one
objective. Furthermore, Milner highlighted the importance of the pathway of influence the
MNCs in question used. In the United States, the large oil firms sought to influence the trade
negotiations through the executive branch, while domestic oil firms influenced trade negotiations
through the legislative branch. This aspect of Milner’s case study addresses the question: which
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pathway of influence is most successful in the United States, as well as in other countries. Last,
Milner points out the transnational coalitions excluding the government are possible solutions as
well. In the oil negotiations, this was what ultimately occurred after the international
negotiations between the United States and Britain failed. The large firms involved created their
own agreement amongst themselves. This was also what PAA and BOAC attempted to do in the
civil aviation negotiations.66 Milner’s analysis of these two cases using the two-level game
theory illustrates multiple interesting aspects to international negotiations. And just as in Krauss’
comparative case study, Milner discovers the importance and complexity of the domestic
negotiating table and its impacts on the international negotiations.
Richard C. Eichenberg applies the two-level game theory as a theoretical framework in
his analysis of U.S. and West German relations on intermediate nuclear force.67 While the
negotiations included all of NATO, Eichenberg focused his study on the bilateral relations
between the United States and West Germany in order to better understand international
negotiations. Throughout the case there was a significant amount of “flip-flopping” in which
both states altered their opinions on the issue at hand. As in Krauss and Milner’s studies,
Eichenberg found leaders had to alter their initial preferences in order to match their domestic
win-sets. However, in the end an agreement was reached in which there was a NATO
deployment of INF. Following the deployment of NATO, its largest opposition was not the
funding, rather the ideological questions it raised. This led to questions of ratification of the
treaty at both the U.S. and West German domestic levels.
This case illustrated, yet again, the importance of the domestic negotiating table. The
domestic level is what ultimately determines if an international negotiation’s outcome is ratified
and therefore implemented. Throughout the INF negotiations, leaders had to manipulate their
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domestic tables to fit what they sought out of the negotiations. Leaders also had to alter their
objectives to fit their domestic win-sets. This case illustrated the importance of domestic
institutions in international negotiations.68 These institutions include political parties, political
institutions and bureaucracies. Eichenberg finds the, “variations are rooted in domestic
institutions.”69 Through Eichenberg’s analysis of these international negotiations, two-level
game theory highlights further important factors in the process and yet again reiterates the
importance and crucial component of the domestic level.
In summary, Putnam’s two-level game theory is critical in the development of theoretical
approaches to the study of international negotiations and their outcomes because it is so vastly
different from the previous theoretical approaches. Moravcsik states there are three key ways in
which two-level game theory differs from the previous theoretical approach to international
negotiations: it is a theory of international bargaining, it places an emphasis on the statesman as
the central actors and lastly, the statesman’s strategies reflect a simultaneous “double-edged”
calculation of constraints and opportunities.70 Two-level game theory’s revolutionary approach
to the analysis of international negotiations causes it to be used as a base for many scholars’
further research on international negotiations.

Three Levels of Analysis
Putnam’s two-level game theory ignited the spark that caused many scholars to extend
his theory and adapt it to fit international negotiations more accurately. Lee Ann Patterson and
Jeffrey Knopf use Putnam’s two-level game theory as the basis of their theories on international
negotiations—“three level game analysis” 71 and “three-and-three theory” respectively. 72
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Patterson constructs her theoretical framework in order to analyze the complex
interactions within the European Community. Her three-level analysis provides significant
insight into the holes of Putnam’s two-level game theory and highlights further aspects that
should be brought to the forefront when analyzing international negotiations. Patterson argues,
“the unique structure of the EC requires that Putnam’s two-level game be expanded to a threelevel interactive game in which negotiations at the domestic, community and international levels
affect policy options at each of the other levels.”73 Once Putnam’s two-level game theory is
expanded into Patterson’s three-level interactive game, the simultaneous interactions occurring at
all three levels allowing for the production a favorable outcome, are much more visible.
Patterson concludes the analysis of her case by claiming, “a three-level interactive strategy is
important in achieving an acceptable agreement at each level of the game.”74 This questions the
idea of win-sets introduced by Putnam in his two-level game theory.
Through Patterson’s three-level analysis win-sets can be viewed very differently. The
difference between Patterson’s win-sets and Putnam’s win-sets is there are now three different
levels where a win-set must overlap. Therefore, the negotiation process is far more complex and
the overlap where the win-set falls is far more specific. However, while this model is more
complex, it can also be said it is far more realistic to international negotiations since more actors
are represented in Patterson’s approach.
Patterson stipulates there are three levels of negotiations: international negotiations
(Level I), community negotiations—negotiations at the EC level (Level II) and domestic
negotiations—negotiations within the member states of the EC (Level III). The “three-level”
framework simply adds the community negotiations as a third middle level of negotiations to be
analyzed when analyzing international negotiations. This allows us to deepen our understanding
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of international negotiations by separating the negotiations further into specific categories. Other
than adding this third level to Putnam’s theoretical framework, Patterson maintains all the other
attributes of two-level game theory in her three-level interactive approach. She reinforces the
idea that negotiations are occurring simultaneously throughout and between all levels in question
and there are specific win-set combinations that will yield the best outcome. However her winsets differ from those of Putnam since it is the option best suited to each level. Patterson is not
the only one to modify Putnam’s two-level game theory. Similarly to Patterson, Jeffrey W.
Knopf uses Putnam’s two-level game theory as base to construct his three leveled approach.
Knopf uses Putnam’s two-level game theory as a springboard for his theoretical
approach. Knopf highlights three specific weaknesses in Putnam’s theory and uses these
weaknesses to build his own theoretical approach to international negotiations. He believes
Putnam’s two-level game theory does not focus on all three levels of interactions involved in
international negotiations. Second, Knopf claims two-level game theory does not give enough
attention to institutional links between states. Last, Knopf highlights Putnam’s insufficient
attention to the actions of domestic groups in the process of international negotiations. 75 Knopf
proposes taking certain aspects of two-level game theory, including the weaknesses, and
expanding upon them in order to reach what he calls his “three-and-three theory”76. The threeand-three theoretical framework attains its name from the three differing domestic-international
interactions Knopf distinguishes at the new third level of negotiations between national and
international. Knopf’s three-and-three theory “distinguishes the three forms of domesticinternational interactions just mentioned [trans-governmental connections, transnational
connections and cross-level connections] and then allows for a third level comprising a state’s
alliance partners or other third-party state actors.”77
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Trans-Governmental Connections
Knopf discusses three domestic-international interactions: trans-governmental
connections, transnational connections and cross-level connections. Trans-governmental
connections occur when “officials on one or both sides are internally divided and one or both
seek to bolster the influence of the like-minded faction in the other government.”78 Transgovernmental connections occur when one of the states government or the alliance involved in
the international negotiation is internally divided into two opposing factions. Both factions in
State I seek to negotiate with the like-minded faction or representative body within State II. In
this instance of domestic-international interactions the division of one state into two separate
factions, may result in complicating the international negotiation. However, it can also permit
both sides to be fairly represented and for the final outcome of the international negotiations to
be a compromise incorporating aspects both factions desired. Trans-governmental connections
received this name since the parties involved in negotiations are governmental.
Transnational Connections
Transnational connections occur when “actors outside the executive branch or its
equivalent, on both sides, [each seek] to add to the like-minded coalition on the other side.”79
Transnational connections consist of when the public of State I will seek to influence negotiation
outcomes by exerting influence over the public of State II. The power of the public and of nongovernmental actors has been significantly researched, particularly in its pertinence to
international negotiations. The title “transnational” therefore applies to the nations or the nongovernmental actors of both states and their influence on international negotiation outcomes.
Cross-Level Connections
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The last form of domestic-international interactions is the cross-level connections. Crosslevel connections also pertain to the power of actors outside of the government—the public,
MNCs and interest groups. Cross-level connections occur when there is “communication
between leaders on one side and domestic constituents on the other, regardless of which side
initiates the connection.”80 The cross-level domestic-international interaction is far more
complex than the previous two domestic-international interactions. Cross-level connections
include the government of State I attempting to influence negotiation outcomes by influencing
the public or non-governmental domestic actors in State II; the public or non-governmental
domestic actors of State I attempting to influence negotiation outcomes by influencing the
government of State II. It is for this reason that cross-level connections receives its name since
the opposite level of each state is seeking to influence once another. Each of the domesticinternational interactions introduced by Knopf possesses their own advantages in an application
to the analysis of international negotiations.
Knopf argues that by using these three domestic-international interactions as ways to
categorize international negotiations and account for alliances and other third-party state actors
throughout the negotiations, the final analysis of the international negotiation will be far more
realistic and concrete than any findings drawn through Putnam’s two-level game theory.
Throughout the three domestic-international interactions, Knopf refers to domestic actors and
how they can influence and be influenced in each of these interactions. These domestic actors
consist of “actors outside the executive branch or its equivalent.”81 This means of categorizing
domestic actors, leaves Knopf’s theoretical framework more open and therefore applicable to a
wider variety of cases.
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Knopf builds upon a second theory in his analysis of societal actors’ impact on U.S.
decisions regarding nuclear arms control throughout the Cold War.82 In this analysis, Knopf uses
the domestic structure approach to illustrate his three-and-three theory explained above.83 By
building his theory off of this theoretical approach as well, Knopf allows for the evaluation of
non-state domestic actors in international negotiations. Knopf provides three understandings of
domestic politics and their interactions with international negotiations as the basis of his final
theory: cooperation theory, domestic preferences and the domestic structure. Knopf articulates
these three understandings highlight an intervening factor between society and the government.
Each of these approaches offers a different contribution to the base that serves Knopf in the
creation of his three-and-three theory.
Cooperation Theory
Cooperation theory is defined as “a mutual adjustment of behavior by states in order to
coordinate their policies in an area where, because of potential costs or risks of such actions,
policy coordination would not automatically occur.”84 Cooperation theory assumes many of the
same assumptions as neo-realists: that states are unitary rational actors and they respond to the
actions of external actors.85 Cooperation theory can aid in an understanding of international
negotiations particularly by taking into account the importance of cooperation within a state to
create one objective for the international negotiation. However, cooperation theory can be very
one sided in its analysis of international negotiations since it does not account for the multitude
of societal actors at play at the domestic negotiating table. It views domestic actors as a
constraint upon the international negotiation, since they may not have a unified objective. This
causes cooperation theory to focus too heavily on the systems level of analysis.
Domestic Preferences
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Preferences of the domestic arena are often times influenced by societal interests. This
manner of influence is commonplace in studies of the political economy where coalitions of
business firms or economic sectors influence the preferences of the domestic level.86
Specifically, the role of epistemic communities, defined as “groups of technical specialists who
share common causal understandings and policy prescriptions,” is believed to influence the
preferences of the domestic level.87 It is argued that epistemic communities present certain
preferences of the society at the domestic level, thereby influencing the ultimate objective of
international negotiations of the domestic level.
Domestic Structure
The domestic structure is an important institutionalist approach in determining the
societal impact on international negotiations. This approach focuses on the importance of
domestic institutions and is the most similar to Putnam’s two-level game theory in its theoretical
framework and assumptions.88 However, it is important to note that some elaborations of this
theoretical approach have adopted a statesman-centered framework where societal factors do
determine state action.89
Knopf highlights that in spite of these very different approaches to understanding societal
actors impact on the domestic level’s objective for international negotiations, there is still an
issue in finding the causal relationship between societal actors, state preferences and the
outcomes of international negotiations.90 He argues, “knowledge of the “policy networks” that
link state and society within a given system is still important, because this determines what
institutional avenues are available for influencing policy.”91 From these three theoretical bases,
Knopf is able to formulate his “bottom-up” theoretical framework. In his bottom-up theoretical
framework, Knopf argues societal actors influence state preferences through three different

25
mechanisms of influence: mass electoral pressure, shifting elite coalitions and bureaucratic
manipulation of ideas.92 Knopf argues each of these mechanisms provides a different pathway of
influence for societal actors. Furthermore, Knopf uses his three-and-three theory as means to
further explain these three mechanisms in their application to international negotiations, since in
international negotiations there are more factors at play that influence the domestic table.
Mechanism I: Mass Electoral Pressure
The first mechanism Knopf discusses is mass electoral pressure. This mechanism “is
based on the idea that influence is gained by exerting pressure, and focuses on the electoral
arena.”93 Electoral pressure is significant in regimes where the people elect the government.
Knopf emphasizes that electoral pressure can work in two ways. It can serve as a means to
influence the head of state and it can serve as a means to influence the legislative body to act in a
representative manner of societal preferences.94
Mechanism II: Shifting Elite Coalitions
The second mechanism, shifting elite coalitions, “comes from alternatives to the pressure
model that emphasize information and ideas as useful resources, focusing on the legislative
arena.”95 This mechanism of influence focuses the legislative branch of government, Congress
for example. Unlike in the electoral pathway, “organizations seeking a change…by pooling their
resources and coordinating their activities with elites who share some of their policy goals,
citizens’ groups can stimulate action by and enhance the capabilities of like-minded political
elites.”96 Shifting elite coalitions enables advocacy groups and epistemic communities to
become part of the elite coalition formation and also potentially become an actor in the formation
of state preferences on international negotiations.
Mechanism III: Bureaucratic Manipulation of Ideas
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The third mechanism is similar to the second in that it draws on alternative pathways of
influence which emphasize information and ideas.97 However, in the third mechanism the
influence is targeted at bureaucracies rather than the legislative branch. This mechanism is
driven by issue networks, policy communities and epistemic communities which often represent
the idea of a collective group of experts on the issue area. Of these advocacy groups, it is found
that epistemic communities are the most respected and therefore maintain the most influence
over bureaucratic relations and ultimately state preferences in international negotiations. Within
these advocacy groups, a policy “entrepreneur” who seeks to promote specific state preferences
is identifiable.98 In international negotiations, the decisions are ultimately made by the
executive. Therefore, the policy communities and the entrepreneurs often seek to influence
foreign policy bureaucracies, such as the NSC, the Defense Department and the CIA.
These three mechanisms of influence all serve as a pathway for societal actors to
influence the domestic win-set in international negotiations. After presenting his three
mechanisms of influence, Knopf argues, “it is important to consider the possible impact of
interactions between domestic U.S. activism and advocacy efforts by governmental and societal
actors abroad.”99 It is here that Knopf applies his three-and-three theory as a factor that can also
alter the domestic table in international negotiations. Knopf claims that while these mechanisms
occur within a state, they can also be manipulated by the foreign state included in the
international negotiations. The domestic actors that influence the domestic win-set and
ultimately the outcome of international negotiations consist of any actor outside of the executive
branch or its equivalent.100 This allows Knopf’s theoretical framework to be applicable in many
different circumstances and accounts for the numerous domestic actors which are highlighted
throughout Knopf’s work and other scholar’s work that applies Putnam’s two-level game theory.
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Corporatist Theory
There are multiple theories within political literature which examine the role of interest
groups in political decision-making and international negotiations. Interest groups are a way for
the public to influence political decision-making and the outcome of international negotiations.
They often represent a collective opinion from a body of the public, various corporations or
associations. One of theoretical approaches is corporatist theory. This theory offers an
explanation for the involvement of interest groups in political decision-making and international
negotiations and the growing presence of interest group influence in democracies and the control
they have on states and decision-making. While there are many theories of interest groups’
political involvement, corporatist theory specifically focuses on interest groups representing
corporations. Therefore, the theory also touches upon collective political action by large
corporations.
Political scholars such as Katzenstein discuss corporatist theory and the presence of
corporate interest groups in western democracies.101 Katzenstein found that economic openness
and democratic corporatism shape the politics and policy of industrial adjustments.102
Katzenstein analyzed corporatist theory in small democratic states such as Austria and
Switzerland. In these cases, he found corporatist theory offered a sufficient explanation for
industrial adjustments and political decisions. Corporatist theory also addresses theories for the
collective political action of large corporations.
Corporations engage in collective political action when a group of individual
corporations allows an interest group to represent one opinion for the collective body. As Olson
discusses, corporate collective action will dictate a collective prescription.103 This poses
difficulties in larger countries where one interest group represents a small percentage of the
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public. In large states, collective action will not benefit everyone. Rather the small percentage
represented by the interest group will benefit, since the expressed opinion of one interest group is
not the opinion of the majority. Olson goes further and claims collective action provides the best
outcome in states where the public is unified and the majority is represented by one body such as
a union or one large interest group.104 In such a situation, collective action will benefit the
majority of the public and therefore the state as a whole.
There are various theories which seek to explain the incentives for corporations to engage
in political action and furthermore the incentives of collective action. Kathleen Getz enumerates
upon the various theoretical explanations for corporate political action.105 Getz argues there are
eight theoretical explanations for corporate political action. These theories are interest group
theory, collective action theory, political choice theory, transaction cost theory, resource
dependency theory, exchange theory, institutions theory and agency theory.106 Each of these
theoretical explanations provides a different theoretical framework to use in an analysis of
corporations decisions. While Getz discusses the theoretical explanations for corporations’
choice to be politically active, Burris goes further and discusses the various theories of businesspolitical partnerships.107 Burris discusses six business-political partnership theories; four of the
theories discussed by Burris predict the dominant firms will be the most powerful firms and they
will seek long-term stability in the economy. These theories are core-periphery theory, innercircle theory, managerialism theory, domestic-multinational theory. The final two theories,
Yankee-Cowboy theory and regulatory environments theory, discuss the importance of a
corporation’s geographical location and the political partnerships this will dictate, such as
relationships with the elected representative from that region. Corporatist theory offers a unique
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explanation for corporations’ political involvement; however corporatist theory only accounts for
corporations’ political involvement through interest groups and collective political action.

Domestic Structure Approach
Knopf skims the surface of the domestic structure approach in his overview of the three
theoretical bases to his bottom-up theory of domestic and international interactions. Milner also
touches upon aspects of the domestic structure approach in her case studies, in particular the case
study on oil negotiations between the United States and Britain. The domestic structure
approach to international negotiations highlights the importance of the institutions, domestic
actors and links between a state’s society and the foreign policy apparatus. The domestic
structure approach is formed around the assumption that the structure of a state and the pathways
that exist to link the society to the state, both impact a state’s foreign policy development. Peter
Gourevitch, Peter J. Katzenstein and Thomas Risse-Kappen all discuss the importance of
domestic structure to understand the links between society and the state and its impact on
international negotiations.
Gourevitch and Katzenstein both highlight the importance of state strength in its relation
to the domestic structure and its impact on international negotiations.108 When the authors refer
to state strength they assume a state is either a strong state or a weak state.109 The strength of a
state corresponds to a state being ‘state-centered’ or ‘society-centered’ respectively. Gourevitch
defines, “strong states, or state-centered policy networks, policy-formation corresponds to the
model of unitary government: the state, emanating from the public or some other sovereign,
formulates policy which is an articulation of collective interests…Its unitary structure allows it to
impose that policy over the objections of particularistic interests.”110 He also states, “weak states
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(or society-centered policy networks) policy-formation corresponds to a model of pluralistic
government: social forces are well-organized and robust. Public institutions are fragmented;
power is formally distributed among a large number of interdependent but autonomous
agencies.”111 The strength of a state will determine if it is state-centered or society-centered.
This, in turn, will determine if a state’s foreign policy apparatus has more or less linkages with
its society. Katzenstein defines domestic structures as the balance found between a state and a
society and whether one wins out over the other.112
Katzenstein’s description of the domestic structure of a state goes more in depth when he
introduces the importance on the links between the state and society aided by bureaucracies.113
Both public and private bureaucracies serve important purposes in creating the domestic
structure of a state. However, whether or not a state has significant bureaucracies with enough
strength to impact state preferences will depend upon whether the state is state-centered or
society-centered. Risse-Kappen discusses the importance of institutions in understanding the
domestic structure, particularly since they often serve as a link between the society and the state
and therefore can communicate the society’s preferences to the state.114 Katzenstein also claims
the presence and strength of political parties within a state can shape its domestic structure.
Partisan attributes can affect the domestic structure through a variety of means: through the
structure of the government, through their impact on the society, and through their influence on
specific bureaucracies.
Risse-Kappen discusses the importance of domestic structure and the coalition building
processes in understanding the relationship between the society, the state and the international
negotiations.115 In regards to his emphasis on the coalition building process, Risse-Kappen
states, “one should analyze the coalition building process within societies and political systems.
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These approaches focus on the “policy networks,” that is, the mechanisms and processes of
interest representation by political parties and interest groups that link the societal environment
to the political systems.”116 Here Risse-Kappen articulates the idea that a coalition is a policy
network that links the society to the state and therefore represents the society’s preferences, such
as a coalition in the U.S. Congress. Gourevitch shares Risse-Kappen’s belief of the importance
of coalition building as a determining factor. Gourevitch states, “coalition analysis enables us to
see how the process of getting a policy adopted affects its content.”117
State strength, bureaucratic importance and coalition building are three characteristics
that dominate the literature on the domestic structure approach. Gourevitch, Katzenstein and
Risse-Kappen all articulate the importance of understanding the domestic structure. They all
stipulate that the domestic structure of a state provides significant insight into understanding how
and why a state’s foreign policy is formulated. Their arguments indicate the domestic structure
of a state will impact the outcomes of international negotiations, because of their impact on the
domestic win-set. Furthermore, Gourevitch argues this influence is two-way and the
international structure will impact the domestic structure just as the domestic structure will
impact the international one. Still, the overall consensus remains: the domestic structure of a
state cannot be overlooked in an examination of international negotiations.

Conclusion
There are many theoretical approaches for analyzing international negotiations. These
theoretical approaches span from the traditional approach of realism—as well as other basic
theoretical schools of thought—to Putnam’s groundbreaking two-level game theory, to modern
complex theories, such as Knopf’s three-and-three theory, which have evolved over time in order
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to incorporate the numerous factors present in international negotiations. Each of the theoretical
approaches surveyed in this theoretical literature review contributes something different to the
analysis of international negotiations. Furthermore, the theoretical literature highlights how
these theoretical approaches are all interconnected and how when applied together they can
allow for an in depth analysis of international negotiations. Throughout my research I will draw
from the theories highlighted here in order to interpret my findings. However, an adaptation of
Knopf’s three-and-three theory will be the primary theoretical framework which I will use in my
analysis of MNC influence on international trade negotiations between the United States and the
European Union. But, as this theoretical literature review has shown, each of these theoretical
frameworks will illuminate a different and important factor in international relations, and
therefore none of them can be overlooked.
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Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology

Multinational corporations are actors growing in importance in the international political
arena. Their role in political decisions appears to have significantly increased throughout the
past decades because of economic interdependence and ties between corporations across borders.
This study explores the level of influence of MNCs on international trade negotiations, building
on theoretical works surveyed in Chapter One. In order to explore the impact of multinational
corporations on international trade negotiations I will examine their roles in two case studies.
Specifically, I will determine the levels and means of influence MNCs exert on trade negotiation
outcomes. The first case will pertain to the creation of the High-Level Regulatory Council in
2005. The second case will discuss the 1997 negotiations between the European Union and the
United States regarding safety regulations. Further evidence will be gathered through interviews
with members of two major corporations involved in the cases surveyed: General Motors Co.
and Volkswagen AG. This approach will allow for a rich analysis of the impact of MNCs on
international trade negotiations.

Overview of Research Design
Throughout this project, I explore the research question: what is the impact of MNCs on
international trade negotiations? This study employs an extension of the three-and-three theory
by Jeffrey Knopf, which itself draws from Robert Putnam’s breakthrough two-level game
theory.118 However, Knopf’s theory argues there are three levels of interactions in international
negotiations: the domestic level, the domestic-international level and the international level. At
the domestic-international level there are three forms of domestic-international interactions that
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can occur during international negotiations: trans-governmental connections, trans-national
connections and cross-level connections. Each of these domestic-international interactions offers
a different pathway of influence between the domestic and international levels of the states
involved.
In my extension of Knopf’s three-and-three theory, I focus on one of the domesticinternational connections: cross-level connections. Cross-level connections best fits my analysis
since it accounts for foreign actors influencing a foreign government. The structure of crosslevel connections accounts for the presence of a MNC operating in a foreign country and the
influence it may have over the host country’s government during international negotiations; and
the presence of a MNC in its home country and the influence it may have over its home
government during international negotiations. This structure makes cross-level connections ideal
for the study of MNC influence on home and host governments throughout international
negotiations. Furthermore, the structure of cross-level connections allows me to account for the
presence of the same MNC in both State A and State B in my theoretical model.
In cross-level connections there are two states involved in international negotiations, state
A and state B—home and host countries respectively. Both states are divided at the domesticinternational level into opposing factions—each seeking different outcomes of the international
negotiation. This division allows for increased influence of external actors on the decisionmaking process through two main pathways of influence. The first pathway consists of external
actors in the domestic arena of state A, influencing the governmental actors of state B and vice
versa—meaning it is a two-way pathway of influence. The second pathway of influence consists
of the governmental actors of state A influencing the external actors in the domestic arena of
states B, and vice versa. My extension of Knopf’s theory takes this cross-level connection
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framework and adapts it to understand the role of multinational corporations as external actors in
the domestic arena.
The theoretical model I develop in order to analyze the influence of MNCs on
international negotiations also draws upon the domestic structure approach (see Figure 1). As
discussed in Chapter One, the domestic structure approach claims the structure of the domestic
arena of a state will play a determining factor in international negotiations. The structure of a
domestic arena can allow, aid or inhibit the influence of external actors on international
negotiations. The domestic structure mainly provides various pathways of influence for external
actors to influence international negotiations, and in some instances, by influencing the domestic
win-set. The research done on the domestic structure approach reinforces the fact that it cannot
be overlooked when examining international negotiations.

Figure 1: Theoretical Model
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Theoretical Model
The theoretical model I develop (Figure 1) extends upon a combination of Knopf’s theory
and the domestic structure approach. My theoretical model acknowledges MNCs as nongovernmental actors in the domestic arena and the fact that the same MNC may be present in
both state A and state B’s domestic arenas. It also accounts for the domestic structure of each
state, viewing the domestic structure of each state as an intervening variable to the pathways of
influence used by the MNC. There are two pathways of influence in my theoretical model. The
first consists of a domestic MNC in state A, influencing state A’s domestic structure and
therefore international negotiation outcomes, as seen through two-level game theory. The
second pathway of influence consists of the same MNC, yet now considered a foreign MNC
since it is operating in state B, influencing the domestic structure of state B and therefore
international negotiations. Both of these pathways are displayed in Figure 1.
The hypotheses I will test through this research are:

H1: If a multinational corporation influences its home country’s government, then it will
be more successful at influencing international negotiation outcomes.
H2: If a multinational corporation influences its host country’s government, then it will
be less successful at influencing international negotiation outcomes.
H3: A state-centered country will permit multinational corporations to be less successful
at influencing international negotiation outcomes directly through governmental actors,
but more successful through non-governmental actors.
H4: A society-centered country will permit multinational corporations to be successful at
influencing international negotiation outcomes directly through governmental actors.
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H0 (null hypothesis): If multinational corporations influence their home country’s
government, then they will not influence international negotiation outcomes.

Figure 2: Variable Model

MNC Activity:
Independent
Variable

Domestic Structure:
Intervening Variable

International Level
and Final Outcome:
Dependent
Variable

The independent variable in my theoretical model is MNC Activity. In order to
operationalize this independent variable, several factors must be taken into account. MNC
activity refers to whether or not a MNC is active in influencing international negotiations.
Furthermore, it refers to the level of activity of a MNC in international negotiations. I will
measure the level of MNC activity by analyzing the documented interactions between the MNC
in question and the government. From these records, which will be included in my case studies,
I will determine MNC activity by examining interactions between the MNC and the government
during the international negotiation. Specifically, whether or not the interactions increased,
remained the same or decreased after the negotiations began. I will measure the MNC’s level of
activity with both their home and host governments. Measuring the level of activity between the
MNC and both governments will provide a measurement to use in a comparison in my final
analysis.
In order to operationalize the intervening variable—the domestic structure of the state—
first we must define the state’s domestic structure. This may be done by using the state strength
argument: “strong states” versus “weak states” or “state centered policy networks” versus
“society centered policy networks”.119 This argument states that strong state will have state
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centered policy networks—often times seen with a unitary government: “the state emanating
from the public or some other sovereign, formulates policy which is an articulation of collective
interests…Its unitary structure allows it to impose that policy over the objections of
particularistic interests.”120 On the other hand, weak states will consist of society centered policy
networks where policy formation corresponds to a pluralistic governmental model: “social forces
are well-organized and robust. Public institutions are fragmented; power is formally distributed
among a large number of interdependent but autonomous agencies…The United States is
obviously the most commonly cited exemplar.”121 The state strength argument is a method to
operationalize the intervening variable, and furthermore it is frequently used in academic
research to operationalize domestic structure.
Operationalizing the state’s domestic structure will enable us to determine which
approach will enable a MNC to be the most successful in its attempts to influence international
negotiations: an indirect or a direct approach. Therefore, the second step of operationalizing the
intervening variable is to determine the pathway of influence the MNCs tended to use to attempt
to influence the international negotiation. The intervening variable highlights how the
independent variable, MNC activity, affects the dependent variable, international negotiation
outcomes. Ultimately this would determine if the domestic structure of a state impacts the causal
relationship between MNC activity and the international negotiation outcome significantly.
In order to operationalize the dependent variable I will compare the final outcome of the
international negotiations to the outcomes pressured for by the MNC throughout the
negotiations. Furthermore, this comparison can be strengthened by examining the satisfaction of
the MNC with the final outcome of the international negotiation. In order to measure their
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influence on international negotiations I will determine whether the MNCs are satisfied or
dissatisfied with the final outcome.
In summary, this theoretical model will enable me to examine the role of a MNC as it
operates within two different countries—its home and host countries. Furthermore, the attribute
of the domestic structure as an intervening variable in my theoretical model provides insight on
the pathways of influence used by MNCs during international negotiations. The structure of my
theoretical model will provide an in depth analysis of my research and ultimately will allow me
to draw conclusions regarding my hypotheses.

Methodology
The methodology employed for this study is the comparative case study method. This
method of research is great method that combines the richness and rigor of the study of
international relations. The comparative case study method is most appropriate when the
research explores a specific problem, decision or event; when there are a small number of
instances being examined in the research; when the author wants to explore the applicability and
usefulness of the theory; and when the process is the main focus of the research. The
classifications of the comparative case study method qualify my research to use this method to
conduct my research.
Many scholars examining the process of international negotiations use the comparative
case study method as the basis for their research.

For example, Robert Putnam and Jeffrey

Knopf both used case studies as a manner to explore international negotiations and then to
exhibit each of their theoretical approaches.122 In Evans, Jacobson and Putnam’s book, Double
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Edged Diplomacy, the comparative case study is used in most chapters to demonstrate two-level
game theory.123 These scholars introduced their new theoretical frameworks and then developed
them further through an application to a real example of international negotiations. The
application of a theoretical framework to specific cases strengthens the arguments made in the
theory by exhibiting them in real scenarios.
The cases examined in this study will pertain to international trade negotiations dealing
with the automotive industry. In order to collect the necessary data for my case studies I will
utilize government documents, bureaucratic documents, press releases and corporate information
publically available. These data sources will allow me to build a narrative of the two case
studies I will examine and then use them to conduct my research.
I will also use interviews as a method to conduct research. These interviews will be
conducted with members of two MNCs I focus on in my case studies and in my analysis—
General Motors Co. and Volkswagen AG. Specifically, the interviewees will consist of members
of each corporation’s government relations department. The use of interviews with current
officials of large MNCs will allow my research to be up to date and reflect current connections
between MNCs and the government. Therefore it will provide my comparative case study
method and my research overall with a second rich and compelling layer of information which I
can use in my analysis. The combination of the comparative case study method with interviews
will enhance this study of the influence of MNCs on international negotiations outcomes.

Interview Questions
These are the interview questions that will be asked of all the interviewees. However, in
order to have a deeper understanding of each company and their unique structures and
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relationships with their governments, more specific questions were be asked depending on the
position of the interviewee (see Appendix A)

Case Study Selection Criteria
In order to select the cases surveyed in this study, I determined the international
negotiations surveyed must be trade negotiations that were completed within the last two
decades. This time frame would ensure there would be conclusive evidence on the outcome of
the international negotiations. I narrowed my search further to international trade negotiations
between the United States and the European Union, which pertained to the automotive industry
and therefore included the automotive corporations, General Motors Co. and Volkswagen AG.
Each of these case study selection criteria were chosen for specific reasons.
The transatlantic marketplace is a dominant force in the global economy. The United
States has been a global economic superpower for decades and is home to many influential
MNCs that operate around the globe. The European Union has been a growing political and
economic actor since inception after the end of World War II. The growth and power of the
European Union in international politics causes external actors such as the United States, to
interact with it regarding economic issues. Therefore, because of the economic power of these
two political units, there are significant international trade agreements and trade negotiations
occurring between the European Union and the United States. Since the European Union is not a
state, but a political unit, the intervening variable of domestic structure is applied to the structure
of the European Union as a political unit.
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General Motors Co. (GM) and Volkswagen AG (VW) are the two MNCs I will focus on
throughout this study. Both of these MNCs bring something important to my analysis; however
they are still similar enough to use the same theoretical model for both. GM is a U.S.-based
MNC in Detroit, Michigan, and its European headquarters are in Russelsheim, Germany. It is
one of the largest U.S. and global automotive companies with eleven total brand holdings and
operating on 6 continents.124 VW has many similar qualities to GM. VW is a German based
MNC in Wolfsburg and has a large branch in the United States, mainly in Fairfax Virginia. It is
Germany’s largest automotive company and a large competitor on the international arena
operating on six continents as well. Lastly, both VW and GM are owned partially by the
government: the state of Lower Saxony owns approximately 20% of VW125, and the U.S.
Federal Government owns approximately 19% of GM after the auto bailout in 2008-09.126
Analyzing both of these MNCs in the two cases surveyed in this study will allow me to address
the hypotheses I will answer in my analysis. It will also allow my results to be more
generalizable since I conducted two case studies and analyzed the role of two MNCs in
international negotiations.

Case Studies
The proceeding cases examine negotiations between the European Union and the United
States with economic and regulatory legislative outcomes. Chapter Three and Chapter Four
examine the history of the negotiations in question, the actors involved throughout the process,
details of the negotiations and the final outcome. These sections of the chapters illustrate the
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variables examined in the theoretical model presented above, and the causal relationships
between the variables.

Case Study 1: Creation of the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Form
The United States and the European Union have had positive political and economic
relations. Both political units continue to pursue a mutually beneficial relationship, particularly
in regards to economic issues. The first case study I examine in Chapter Three discusses the
2005 Summit negotiations between the United States and the European Union. I focused on the
negotiations pertaining to the harmonization of regulations between the two political units. The
outcome of these negotiations was the creation of the High Level Regulatory Cooperation
Forum. This forum would enable a wide variety of actors from the United States and the
European Union to pursue harmonization of the regulations further. The attention paid to the
automotive industry in these economic regulations is because it is central to U.S. and European
economic prosperity and this prosperity would increase if regulations acting as non-tariff barriers
could be harmonized to one standard.

Case Study 2: Safety Regulation Harmonization in 1997
The automotive industry is an important sector of the U.S. and European economies, and
it is a large topic of negotiation between the EU and the United States. The second case
examined in this study pertains to the joint research of the United States and the European Union
and the negotiations between the two political units on the potential harmonization of a divergent
safety regulation. In 1997, the U.S. Congress directed the National Highway Traffic Safety
Association (NHTSA) to evaluate European regulations in an attempt to harmonize the U.S.
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regulations with the European counterparts. NHTSA was the primary actor in this case, along
with its European counterpart of the European Enhanced Vehicle Safety Committee (EEVC).
Both actors sought to harmonize their divergent domestic regulations into one cohesive
regulation that would benefit the automotive industry, the transatlantic marketplace and most
importantly the constituents.

Conclusion
The methodology and theoretical model described in this chapter will be used throughout
the rest of this study. The application of the theoretical model the cases surveyed in this study
will allow for an in depth analysis that will ultimately provide me with findings conclusive to my
hypotheses. Furthermore, the comparative case study method I have chosen will include
interviews in the two MNCs I will focus on: General Motors Co. and Volkswagen AG. These
research methods and the theoretical model will provide insight on my research and enable me to
conduct my final analysis and conclusions regarding my hypotheses.
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Chapter 3: The Creation of Cooperation

Economic relations between the United States and the European Union have grown since
the end of the Cold War. They have strengthened despite tense political relations beginning in
2001.127 This steady increase in economic relations may be attributed to the rise in power and
reach of MNCs around the globe and it illustrates the increased economic integration and
interdependence of the transatlantic economy. The United States and the European Union are
large marketplaces that dominate the global market with their manufacturing, exports and
financial dominance. The automotive industry and automotive sales comprise a significant
portion of trade between the European Union and the United States, and therefore is vital to both
economies.
The European Union alone represents the largest producer of automotive vehicles in the
world.128 The United States, another one of the world’s largest automotive producing states, is
home to the ‘Big Three’ auto manufacturers: Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Group LLC and
General Motors Co. The presence of MNCs such as General Motors Co. and Volkswagen AG is
felt on five continents around the world. Yet, in spite of the importance of the automotive
industry to the U.S. and European economies, trade in the transatlantic marketplace faces
significant hurdles because of differences in regulations; these divergences create non-tariff
barriers for MNCs operating in both countries. The idea of the harmonization of regulations has
dominated trade negotiations between the European Union and the United States since the 1970s.
This concept is important since it would significantly aid transatlantic trade, especially for large
MNCs operating in both marketplaces and it would provide both countries with economic
benefits. At a summit between the European Union and the United States in 2005, diplomats
created the High Level Regulation Cooperation Forum (HLRC). The Forums’ objective is to
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build upon previous dialogues in order to create better cooperation mechanisms, to establish
better regulations that minimize difference, and to respect each state’s decision making.129 The
Forum is applicable to the whole transatlantic marketplace and all of its sectors.
This chapter will examine the negotiations and the creation of the High Level Regulatory
Cooperation in 2005. First, the relationship between the European Union and the United States,
as it pertained to the creation of the Forum, is vital information for the development of the case.
Second, I will discuss the actors involved throughout the negotiations and the roles they played.
Last, I will detail the 2005 summit negotiations and the negotiations’ ultimate outcome.

History: Evolution of European Union-United States Relations
The European Union and the United States have recognized the importance of
transatlantic trade for decades, yet regulations remain that create non-tariff barriers within the
marketplace. Non-tariff barriers consist of a divergence of regulations which cause MNCs to
adapt, change or reproduce their products for various marketplaces. Previous meetings between
representatives of the European Union and the United States resulted in the foundational
structure used in the 2005 negotiations.
Part of this foundation was first created at the summit between the European Union and
the United States in London in 1998. Each political unit was represented by international level
delegations. The European Union sent the EU Delegation, which had been created in 1954 after
the Johnson Administration formally recognized the ECSC (the European Coal and Steel
Community, the precursor to the European Union).130 In 1998, this delegation was led by
Andres van Agt, the former Dutch Prime Minister.131 The United States delegation was
comprised of top officials from the Clinton Administration. In London, leaders discussed a
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plethora of issues pertaining to European and U.S. cooperation. An outcome of the negotiations
was a joint statement that created the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). This statement
was known as the “TEP Action Plan.” It identified, “a series of elements for an initiative to
intensify and extend multilateral and bilateral cooperation and common actions in the field of
trade and investment.”132 The TEP created the first forum where both political units’ domestic
interests could be represented at the international level, and later served as the primary
foundation used in the creation of the Forum in 2005.
In 1999, diplomats at the Ministerial Conference in the WTO addressed trade concerns
through multilateral and bilateral talks. 133 Issues addressed with multilateral action included
trade facilitation, tariffs, and competition. Issues addressed with bilateral action included
regulatory cooperation, the alignment of standards and regulatory requirements. At this
conference international leaders worked together on transatlantic economic issues. U.S. and EU
officials agreed, “both sides [would] take actions to address technical barriers to trade in goods,
including improving the dialogue between U.S. and EU regulators.”134 This placed the burden
on the domestic level. Second, officials determined both political units would implement the
guidelines from the Action Plan in order to create effective regulatory cooperation and improve
the access to each political unit’s regulatory procedures, placing another burden on the domestic
level actors.135 The domestic level actors’ involvement in the international negotiations clearly
illustrates the interactions and communication between the international and domestic levels.
Third, officials determined, “all interested parties [would] have meaningful input in regulatory
procedures and receive reasonable consideration of their views.”136 This acknowledged the
importance of MNCs in the negotiations because of the impact any outcome would have on
them, and it displays there was communication between them and both international and
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domestic level actors. The 1998 TEP Action Plan was used as a foundation in all further
negotiations regarding the harmonization of regulations.
In 1999, at the Bonn Summit between the European Union and the United States, the
actors met for another round of negotiations. The international leaders called for more
communication and early warnings on domestic regulatory legislation development between the
United States and the European Union.137 Since the regulators were members of their respective
domestic governments, an early warning would force both domestic legislators to take the other
actor into account in regulation development. The communication between both legislatures
represented the actors’ commitment to pursuing the harmonization of regulations and
improvements in a transatlantic marketplace.
In 2002, the European and U.S. leaders convened once again to discuss topics pertaining
to their transatlantic relationship. The outcome of this round of negotiations was the Guidelines
on Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency. Specifically, it “enshrined a political commitment
to dialogue between EU and US regulators.”138 Its objective was, “to improve cooperation
between regulators and to promote transparency to the public in establishing and amending
regulations.”139 The areas targeted by the new guidelines were regulation development,
regulation compatibility, communication between regulators throughout regulation development,
informing the public of the regulations, and encouraging the engagement of non-governmental
actors. Once again a burden was placed upon the domestic level actors in order to make
cooperation at the international level easier, indicating further communication and interaction
between the international and domestic levels. Furthermore, non-governmental actors’ input
could be provided through the, “timely opportunity for all interested parties, both domestic and
non-domestic, to provide meaningful comments concerning regulatory proposals, including
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supporting materials.”140 Since the development of these guidelines, regulatory authorities on
both sides of the Atlantic, “aim at achieving greater convergence of technical rules through a
number of sectoral and methodological regulatory dialogues.”141 Overall, these guidelines
established further rules and processes for the United States and the European Union to
implement and follow.142
The foundation created at these three summits allowed the European Union and the
United States to begin to remove technical barriers to trade by acknowledging each other’s
regulations and work together to make the most harmonized regulations in their individual
marketplaces.143 However, the outcome of each of these negotiations was reflective of the
differences between the two political units. The progress made between the three meetings
detailed above was slow and relatively small. These meeting’s outcomes reflected the best
agreements the international leaders could achieve, while still being restrained by their domestic
levels which were significantly less willing to cooperate. One automotive executive discusses
how international negotiations are great theoretically, but they rarely work, “they are all talk and
no play.”144 Therefore, when the 2005 summit began in June, the international levels and both
domestic levels were finally ready for a concrete outcome.

Case Study: Creating the Forum
Actors
At the 2005 summit, numerous actors were present, each fulfilling their own role and
adding something unique to the various outcomes. The actors present at the 2005 summit in
Washington D.C. can be classified into two different categories: political actors, at the
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international and domestic level, and non-governmental actors, representing both states. All sets
of actors were influential throughout the 2005 negotiations and the resultant creation of the High
Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum. Furthermore, interactions between the actors were
constant throughout the summit and they occurred between the international and domestic level
actors, the domestic level and the non-governmental actors and the international and nongovernmental actors.

Political Actors
In order to understand the roles of political actors and non-governmental actors in the
European Union and the United States, an understanding of each political unit’s domestic
structure is necessary. As seen in Chapter One, state strength in relation to domestic structure
provides a reasoning for which actors are most influential in political decision-making.
Gourevitch and Katzenstein discuss the difference between ‘state-centered’ and ‘societycentered’ states.145 Gourevitch defines, “strong states, or state-centered policy networks, policyformation corresponds to the model of unitary government: the state, emanating from the public
or some other sovereign, formulates policy which is an articulation of collective interests…Its
unitary structure allows it to impose that policy over the objections of particularistic interests.”146
He also says, “weak states (or society-centered policy networks) policy-formation corresponds to
a model of pluralistic government: social forces are well-organized and robust. Public
institutions are fragmented; power is formally distributed among a large number of
interdependent but autonomous agencies.”147
The United States is a society-centered state because of the structure and nature of its
government. The separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches
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of government allow for the public and non-governmental actors to have an impact upon politics.
The European Union is a governmental body representing 27 sovereign member countries.
Therefore, the nature of the European Union’s structure is highly bureaucratic with numerous
individual institutions each of which has their own jurisdiction over an aspect of the European
Community. Therefore, the European Union is a society-centered political unit as well, making
the public influential in EU politics.
The 2005 summit was led by international level officials from the European Commission
and the U.S. Federal Government.148 The U.S. was represented by members of the Bush
Administration. These officials consisted of the President himself and his immediate cabinet
advisers. At the international level, the European Union was represented by the President of the
European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, European Council President, Jean-Claude Junker
and Secretary General of the European Council, Javier Solana.149 These were the three leading
actors for the European Union throughout the summit. However, they mainly interacted with
their respective U.S. counterparts.
Since the summit negotiations covered such a broad array of topics, separate topicspecific negotiations were conducted. The international level actors focused on issues such as
Middle East Peace and counter-terrorism, topics of high importance on each state’s agenda and
in the public eye. Specific domestic level bureaucracies handled the topic-specific negotiations
pertaining to their department. These U.S. bureaucracies, and the domestic level actors that
represented them, included the Commerce Department, the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, the Office of Management and Budget, the Ambassador to the European Union
and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.150 These U.S. domestic level actors
represented portions of the public; however further non-governmental actors were present to
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represent the public with a vested interest in the negotiations. The European Union had domestic
level actors from various bureaucracies as well, such as the Directorate General of Enterprise and
Industry, the External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, the Trade Commission and
the Common Foreign and Security Policy Council. These domestic level actors conducted
dialogues with their respective U.S. domestic level actors and agencies, and were the actors
dealing with topic-specific negotiations—including the transatlantic marketplace and the
harmonization of regulations.

Non-Governmental Actors
Non-governmental actors played a vital role at the 2005 summit. Previous summits
created the precedence that stakeholders’ views would be included in the negotiations, and this
was continued at the 2005 summit. Stakeholders consisted of MNCs, interest groups and
associations. Cultural differences between the United States and European Union cause MNCs
from each political unit to approach the government in different manners. In the United States,
MNCs build much more personal relationships with politicians. These one-on-one relationships
are often built behind closed doors where politicians can truly listen.151 Meanwhile, in Europe
MNCs operate collectively and through associations. These cultural tendencies stick with MNCs
despite the country they are operating in and determine how the MNC will approach a
government. However, some MNCs do alter their approach to governmental officials for the
different countries in which they operate. One auto executive spoke of how in the United States,
General Motors focuses on individual relationships with politicians and regulators, rather than
relationships with intermediary actors and therefore approaching politicians through an
association as they must do in Europe.152
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One powerful and highly present association at the summit was the Trans-Atlantic
Business Dialogue (TABD).153 The TABD was the most prominent non-governmental actor at
the 2005 summit. The TABD was, “the principle business interlocutor with the U.S.
Government and the European Union on the transatlantic economic relationship…serves as the
official dialogue between American and European business leaders and the U.S. cabinet
secretaries and EU commissioners.”154 Volkswagen AG, is a member of the TABD. Therefore,
their opinions and preferred outcomes were communicated to both EU commissioners and U.S.
cabinet secretaries by this association throughout the 2005 summit. However, GM is not a
member of the TABD despite fulfilling the qualifications.

GM’s lack of membership in the

TABD could be attributed to its cultural inclination to government relations. GM builds personal
relationships with both domestic level and international level actors. Furthermore, GM did not
need to be a member of the TABD, since the summit occurred in its home country. This is most
likely the main reason why GM does not see it as beneficial to belong to this specific association.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce was another association present in 2005. They
represented the economic and business interests of U.S. businesses, including General Motors
Co. In relation to transatlantic trade and an EU-US partnership, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
“supports the ongoing efforts to remove non-tariff barriers to trade within the Transatlantic
Economic Council—and believes the transatlantic partners can go further.”155 This nongovernmental actor became a force in the Forum after its creation as a representative of U.S.
business interests in a variety of negotiations.
On the European side, a dominant non-governmental actor involved was the Union of
Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE).156 This association was renamed
and is currently known as Business Europe. Business Europe represents numerous countries,

54
companies and associations from all members of the European Union. Germany houses multiple
automotive producers from around the world; and some of the world’s largest automotive names
call Germany home: Daimler, BMW, Mercedes and Volkswagen. Therefore it comes as no
surprise that one of Business Europe’s powerful associations, the Bundesverband der Deutschen
Industrie, (the Federation of German Industries, or BDI), serves as a united voice for all of
German industry. According to the BDI’s own description, “BDI is the leading organization of
German industry and industry-related services. It speaks on behalf of 38 sector associations and
represents over 100,000 large, medium-sized and small enterprises with a good eight million
employees. Industry speaks with once voice to political institutions at the national, European
and international level.”157 This influential association is one of the primary examples of how
the European approach is much more collective, with the mind-set of “safety in numbers”.
One of BDI’s members is the Verband der Automobilindustrie, (the Association of the
Automobile Industry, or VDA). The VDA represents automotive manufacturers operating in
Germany, including Volkwagen AG and General Motors Co. in national and international
settings and advocates for the German automotive industry.158 Each of these non-governmental
actors involved represents a variety of actors including the MNCs in examined throughout this
study. These non-governmental actors were present throughout the preceding summits,
represented a variety of non-governmental actors at the 2005 Summit in Washington D.C. and
became important actors within the Forum itself.
Cultural differences between European and U.S. corporations explain why more
European associations were documented as present at the 2005 summit. Associations and unions
such as the TABD, BDI, Business Europe and VDA were highly influential. These associations
represented European corporations’ interests more so than U.S. interests. U.S. corporations

55
operate on a personal level. Relationships are built between the corporation and the government,
thereby bridging the intervening actors of associations who have to take all of their members’
desires into account.159 U.S. corporations were at an advantage at the 2005 summit since it was
hosted in their home country, illustrating the importance of the summits location. This allowed
them to play by their rules that they are most accustomed to and not need to adapt to fit European
cultural approaches as they must do in other circumstances. Furthermore, MNCs may have been
present and influential at the negotiations, but simply not documented as such. Members of
government relations departments acknowledge this. They claim very little government relations
and communication between MNCs and any government will occur in the public sphere. It all
must happen in private, behind closed doors, where politicians can let their guard down and truly
listen and negotiate.160 This may also contribute to the divergence in U.S. and European
approaches. Politicians in the United States are much more willing to speak with MNCs from
their own country rather than foreign ones.161 Therefore, foreign MNCs must attempt to
influence politics through associations and intermediary actors, while U.S. MNCs can use their
relationships with the government.

The Negotiations and Outcome
European and U.S. officials addressed a wide range of issues at the 2005 summit. These
issues ranged from the situation in the Middle East to energy security to transatlantic trade.
Negotiations pertaining to transatlantic trade and the harmonization of regulations produced the
High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum described in the public document: Initiative to
Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth.162 Domestic level actors from the
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European Union and the United States conducted these negotiations. At the 2005 summit,
negotiators used the foundations from the three preceding summits as a platform for the new
legislation. The new Forum created a place for domestic actors, non-governmental actors and
stakeholders such as MNCs to discuss the harmonization of regulations in all sectors of the
transatlantic economy, an important step to ensure the future of harmonization attempts.
The key leaders—President Bush and President Barroso—opened negotiations in June of
2005 in Washington D.C.. As previously mentioned, the summit consisted of discussions
between the international level actors, and separate topic-specific dialogues between respective
domestic level actors. International level actors addressed topics most prominent to the mass
public, such as Middle East peace. Less publicized issues, such as the transatlantic marketplace
and the harmonization of regulations, were handled by domestic level actors.
Domestic level actors from the European Union and the United States met and negotiated
issues pertaining to the harmonization of regulations and the transatlantic marketplace. These
domestic-domestic negotiations eventually produced the Forum. The Office of Budget and
Management and the Directorate General of Enterprise and Industry were the two leading
bureaucracies at the negotiations. They had traditionally handled transatlantic regulation
divergences, and therefore the negotiation’s outcome acknowledged their previous dialogues and
ensured their inclusion in any further negotiations within the Forum.

As with the previous

negotiations between the European Union and the United States on the harmonization of
regulations, each state had their own agenda. This made coming to a consensus difficult, since
neither state was willing to compromise on all attributes of their regulations.
The outcome of the negotiations, the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, was
another step towards the ultimate goal of regulation harmonization. Several priorities were
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outlined in the Initiative: to promote further EU-U.S. regulatory cooperation, further legislative
cooperation between the two political units and to continue consultations with stakeholders in the
transatlantic economy. 163 Therefore, the Forum would maintain international level cooperation,
domestic level cooperation and the consultation and incorporation of MNC’s knowledge and
opinions. Furthermore, it would enhance progress towards the harmonization of regulations,
encourage further international level dialogue regarding the transatlantic market, and hopefully
lead to better regulatory legislation on both sides of the Atlantic.164
Specifically, the Forum identifies opportunities for transatlantic cooperation on sectoral
issues, bridging gaps when there is a divergence in the two administrations responsibilities, and
pushing for preemptive dialogues on emerging regulatory issues.165 Potential Forum dialogues
would pertain to topics like, “good regulatory practices, transparency provisions and public
consultation, impact assessment methodologies, and risk assessment methodologies.” 166 It was
the hope these types of dialogues would allow the United States and the European Union to
better understand each other’s regulations and therefore hopefully achieve harmonization.
Furthermore, the Forum would include and continue stakeholder consultation on the various
sectors of the transatlantic economy. These consultations would be provided by, “other
regulators as well as representatives from academia, think-tanks, businesses, NGOs and other
organizations will be invited to participate.”167 The inclusion of non-governmental actors in the
Forum negotiations would ensure the Forum would have a thorough understanding of the
sectoral issues affecting large economic players and therefore citizens of both political units
through potential economic gains or hardships.
The Forum handles regulations from various sectors in the transatlantic economy. These
sectors include pharmaceuticals, communications technology standard, product safety, food
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safety, chemicals and automobile safety. The objective for automobile safety is the,
“cooperation between the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and
DG Enterprise and Industry/Automobile Unit in areas of automobile safety regulations.”168
While the Office of Budget and Management and the Directorate of Enterprise and Industry led
the 2005 negotiations, these two bureaucracies had been the leading domestic actors on
automobile safety regulations prior 2005.
The 2005 Initiative also detailed specifically how the Forum would pursue the
harmonization of regulations for the automotive sector:
“develop agreed workplans for these regulatory cooperation projects and
proceed with implementation. Consider addition topics that may be
suitable for cooperation, such as future collision mitigation technologies,
electronic stability systems and harmonization at the global level of
dummies used in side-impact crash tests. Discuss ways to promote a
science-based approach to global technical regulations under the United
Nations 1998 Agreement.”169

The Forum consequently provided a setting where further negotiations pertaining to automobile
safety regulations could be held. If the final barrier of the divergence in European and U.S.
regulations were eliminated through international cooperation within the Forum, trade in the
automotive sector would significantly increase, benefiting both political units and all MNCs.
In summary, the High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum provides a setting for
regulators from the European Union and the U.S. Government to meet and discuss regulations in
a variety of economic sectors in the transatlantic marketplace. These sectors include the
automotive sector and regulations pertaining to automobile safety. The pursuit of the
harmonization of regulations between Europe and the United States has been an objective of the
industry for years as their international presence has grown. For the automotive sector, the
Forum is a setting where industry officials and specialists can meet with government
representatives and provide detailed information in order to aid the process of the harmonization
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of regulations. The variety of actors included in the Forum illustrates that the European Union
and the United States do intend to reach an understanding in safety regulations for one of the
largest industries in both states. However, many industry representatives are hesitant to put their
faith in another governmental body in the pursuit of the harmonization of regulations in the
transatlantic marketplace.
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Chapter 4: The Side Impact of the Harmonization of Regulations

Governmental regulations are an integral part of the automotive industry. According to
one high level executive, the automotive industry is, “if not the most, one of the most regulated
industries.”170 This indicates the importance governmental regulations have within the
automotive industry and how automotive corporations must therefore account for this. However,
while regulations are imposed for safety purposes, they often create headaches for multinational
automotive manufacturers like General Motors Co. and Volkswagen AG. In addition to having
to meet constantly changing regulations for their home country, large multinational corporations
must meet different regulations for each state in which they produce and sell. The sheer amount
of regulations forces automotive manufacturers to run productions differently and to alter their
products to comply with the regulations for the different marketplaces. Many government
relations executives in the automotive industry hope this will be enough to make everyone
happy.171 However, in a world where technologies change on a daily basis, regulations must
evolve just as quickly.
The harmonization of regulations has been a goal of the United States and the European
Union since 1979.172 The previous chapter discussed the progress made towards this goal at the
2005 European Union and United States summit in Washington D.C.. The outcome of the 2005
negotiations was the High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum. The Forum represented
another step towards the harmonization of regulations in the transatlantic economy. It created a
way for all actors to participate in automotive regulation negotiations. This chapter discusses the
1997 U.S. and European attempt to harmonize side-impact and frontal crash test regulations.
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The United States and the European Union have acknowledged the benefits
harmonization of automotive safety regulations could bring their economies. Both political units
had their own side-impact and front crash test regulations; however the U.S. regulation was
significantly older. This divergence in regulations had created non-tariff barriers within the
transatlantic marketplace. Non-tariff barriers impede transatlantic trade, since alternative
requirements cause corporations to produce different products for each marketplace. In
September 1996, the U.S. Congress directed the National Highway Traffic and Safety
Association (NHTSA) to conduct research on the U.S. and European side-impact regulations.
Ultimately, Congress wanted NHTSA to determine if the differences in the two regulations could
be harmonized, and therefore eliminate one obstacle for MNCs operating in the United States
and Europe. Members of the Directorate General of Enterprise and Industry, NHTSA’s
European counterpart, were happy to work with NHTSA in the hopes of finding a harmonized
regulation for the transatlantic economy. However, each political unit’s unwillingness to
compromise throughout the negotiations made any potential outcome appear bleak.
In this chapter, I first provide a brief explanation of the immediate history preceding the
collaboration of the United States and the European Union on this specific regulation. Second, I
present the actors involved in the negotiations and research. Third, I discuss how representatives
of the European Union and the United States cooperated throughout the discussions. Last, I
present the outcome of this cooperation and the discussions.

History
The United States, the European Union and their bureaucracies worked towards the
harmonization of regulations in other areas of the automotive industry prior to 1997. The pursuit
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of the harmonization of side-impact and frontal crash test regulations began in 1979 at the
Seventh International Technical Conference on Experimental Safety Vehicles in Paris, France.
In 1980, governmental officials, industry representatives and experts, held a public meeting to
discuss these regulations again. Political actors, non-governmental actors and MNCs were
included at both meetings. Their presence represented the importance given to all actors
throughout the regulation making process. This also represented the potential for influence on the
final outcome. These meetings illustrated the intent of the United States and the European Union
to move towards the harmonization of regulations in the automotive industry.
The U.S. regulation on side-impact and frontal crash testing had been in place for thirty
years prior to the Congressional directive in 1996. The U.S. regulation, legally known as
FMVSS No. 208, was first approved by NHTSA in 1972.173 In an ever changing world, though
regulations must be in keeping with the most recent technologies and dangers, the U.S. side
impact and frontal crash test regulation was outdated and therefore potentially useless. The
outdated regulation was the primary cause for the Congressional directive in the fall of 1996.
However, Congress also wanted to push for further progress in the harmonization of regulations.
The European Union adopted their side-impact and front crash test regulation in 1996 and it was
to go into effect in 1997. The new European regulation provided Congress with an incentive to
push NHTSA to update the U.S. regulation, to learn from its European counterparts, and
hopefully to create a harmonized regulation. The goal of the harmonization of regulations
provided NHTSA with three possible outcomes: to rewrite the existing regulation in harmony
with the new European regulation, to add an amendment to the existing U.S. regulation that was
in harmony with the European regulation, or to do nothing and deny both options all together.
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In September 1996, Congress directed NHTSA to conduct research on the differences
between the U.S. and European side-impact and front crash test regulations. The Congressional
directive was the U.S. Federal Government forcing a domestic level actor—NHTSA—to work
towards the harmonization of regulations with the European Union in regards to the automotive
industry.174 The objective of this directive was for NHTSA to determine if the safety of U.S.
citizens would benefit from a harmonized regulation. NHTSA’s leadership in these discussions
causes this case to be significantly different and important from the preceding one. NHTSA
worked closely with their European counterpart which is further reason why this case is so
unique. The Congressional directive stipulated NHTSA would present a report to Congress by
1999 with their research findings and their ultimate decision—whether or not the U.S. and
European regulations would be harmonized.
The European Union and the United States acknowledged the growing importance of the
automotive industry in their highly manufacturing-based economies. The recognition of the
industry and MNCs as important actors in the transatlantic economy is reflected in several
documents jointly published by the United States and the European Union prior to 1997 and
throughout the discussions. These public statements demonstrate the push towards the
harmonization of regulations in 1997 was not only to learn from each other, but also to improve
the large auto manufacturers’ bottom lines through the elimination of various non-tariff barriers
created by regulatory divergences.175 The acknowledgment of the industry as a source of
information in the development of safety regulations continued throughout the discussions. This
continued despite cultural differences between the European Union and the United States which
affect how corporations are viewed in each state. While the historical context is pertinent to this
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case, the actors involved in the discussion provide important information for the case
development.

Case Study: The Harmonization Discussions
Actors
In the 1997 discussion between the European Union and the United States, domestic level
actors were the most present and important throughout the case. This characteristic of this case
study conflicts with most international negotiations, particularly those between the European
Union and the United States. Typically, international level actors are the most important actors
involved in negotiations. However, in 1997 domestic level actors, representing each political
unit, led the discussions. The lack of international level actors throughout this process suggests
this case reflects more domestic-domestic interactions than traditionally seen. There were
several non-governmental actors present throughout this process as well. NHTSA recognized
MNCs and industry representatives as a source of expertise regarding new regulations, since
these actors would be most impacted.176 Robert Putnam helps us understand which actors are
international level actors and which are domestic level actors in his research.177 International
level actors consist of the head of government, diplomats and any international advisers.
Domestic level actors consist of legislative figures, bureaucratic agencies, interest group
representatives and domestic advisers to the head of government.178 These international and
domestic level political actors play important roles, but non-governmental actors are also crucial
players. At both the international and the domestic level, actors can be divided into two different
categories: political actors and non-governmental actors. Throughout these negotiations both
political and non-governmental actors played vital roles in determining the ultimate outcome.
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Political actors are all actors affiliated with a state’s government: executive branch members,
legislative branch members, representatives of governmental bureaucracies and other elected
officials. Non-governmental actors are the actors not affiliated with the government. They often
represent various opinions of the public, but are not elected to their positions.

Domestic Level Actors in the United States
The most prominent domestic level actor for the United States is Congress. Congress
represents the constituents of the United States and acts on their behalf. However, it rarely
interacts with foreign international level actors, which further strengthens its classification as a
domestic level actor. Along with Congress, other domestic level political actors were present
throughout the 1997 discussions. The National Highway Traffic and Safety Association
(NHTSA) was the leading domestic level actor in this case. NHTSA is classified as a domestic
level political actor since it is a governmental bureaucracy. Furthermore, documentation of the
negotiations and current interviews show NHTSA is one of the leading bureaucracies in the
United States for automotive safety regulations.179 While other governmental bureaucracies are
sometimes consulted, in this case NHTSA was the primary leader of the 1997 discussions.
There is significant documentation on the roles and actions of domestic level political
actors in the United States throughout these negotiations, the documentation of the presence of
non-governmental actors, specifically MNCs, is far rarer. Interactions between government
officials and MNCs rarely occur in the public sphere, rather in private, making them more
difficult to document. One automotive executive explained that government relations must
happen in private, behind closed doors, where government officials can let their guard down and
truly listen to industry and corporate opinions and then negotiate.180 However, GM was
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documented as present in the 1997 discussions and provided data to the research. 181 The
presence of MNCs throughout the regulation development process is significant. Furthermore,
MNC representatives interact with both international and domestic level actors. Which actors
they interact with often depends on the regulation in question. The MNC must then choose their
avenue of communication.
Further non-governmental associations from the United States were present during these
negotiations. The Insurance Institute of Highway Safety, the American Automobile
Manufacturers, Motor Vehicle Safety Research Advisory Committee and the International
Harmonization of Research Activities. These non-governmental actors represented the various
domains affected by automotive safety regulations and specifically a harmonized automotive
safety regulation. Therefore, they were invited to participate throughout the discussions and
research. The political and non-governmental actors present at the 1997 discussions represented
various segments of the United States. Their presence ensured that all interested and impacted
parties were heard in the development of regulations. Furthermore, while political actors were
documented as being present, throughout the discussions, non-governmental actors—specifically
industry and MNC representatives—were present despite their presence being less known and
publicized. Their presence was simply kept private in comparison with other actors.
Another important aspect to MNC presence in the 1997 discussions is the cultural
differences between the European Union and the United States. The opinions of nongovernmental actors and industry representatives are held to a high esteem in the United States in
comparison with the European Union. In the United States MNCs are given a presumption of
authority.182 They are respected for understanding how the industry works and for knowing what
they are talking about with regards to safety regulations and for wanting the best safety
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regulations.183 Therefore, MNC input is respected and revered as enlightened information
throughout the regulation development process and a MNC has a larger chance of influencing
regulations and various policies. As another automotive executive points out, the industry is
often a few steps ahead of the safety regulation. After all, this is their job.184 Cultural
differences for corporations effects how MNCs interact with governments during negotiations.
Their approach is further determined by the location of the negotiations and the culture of the
hosting government.
Automotive and industry executives are frequently consulted in the United States rather
than in the European Union. The culture of the United States and their acknowledgement of the
industry as a source of expertise, make it possible for MNCs and other industry representatives to
have their opinions heard and potentially influence the final outcome. The society-centered
domestic structure of the United States permits MNCs to communicate easily with the
government. MNCs use a variety of avenues of communication in order to ensure their opinions
are heard at all levels of government and that their desires are likely represented in the final
outcome.185

Domestic Actors in the European Union
The EU’s structure is highly bureaucratic, since it is an institution representing 27
sovereign member countries on a variety of issues. Therefore, the European Union is comprised
of many bureaucracies; each designated its own area of expertise. However, it is the European
Parliament that approves the regulations and ratifies them into law. In the 1997 discussions, the
Directorate General of Enterprise and Industry was the leading bureaucratic actor for the
European Union. The DG Enterprise and Industry handles numerous regulations for European
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industries, including the automotive industry. However, in this circumstance a special
committee was formed to focus solely on automotive safety regulations. The European
Enhanced Vehicle Safety Committee (EEVC) was founded in 1974 as a specialized committee
dedicated to enhancing vehicle safety.186 The EEVC was created through bilateral agreements
between the United States, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan and Sweden. 187
The committee’s creation was a response to the United States’ foundation of the Experimental
Safety Vehicles International Program. The purpose of the program was, “to ensure the
continuing exchange of information between the participating governments, and their
collaboration to achieve the best use of their available resources in response to the United States’
innovation to participate in the development of experimental safety vehicles.”188
The EEVC constantly interacted with non-governmental actors. At the EEVC’s creation,
it was even commanded to receive input from various knowledgeable actors in the industry.
These actors include automotive manufacturing associations and MNCs. They would provide
data and expertise on research and a viewpoint of how regulations impact the manufacturers and
therefore consumers.189 However, as discussed previously, in European culture MNCs as
individual actors are not highly regarded as a source of information. Rather, the collective
opinion of associations account for much more throughout the European regulation development
process. Therefore, U.S. MNCs are often forced to work within these associations in order to
influence regulation development in the European Union. Furthermore, the structure of the
European Union enables European Parliament to assume the development of regulations. So, in
spite of a MNCs actions and relationship with the EU’s bureaucracies, when Parliament
overtakes the decision-making process, MNCs and their knowledge and input are disregarded.190
The culture of the European Union is a reason for the emphasis on a group oriented approach for
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government relations. This cultural norm gives rise to the powerful non-governmental actors
such as Business Europe, the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, (the Federation of German
Industries, or BDI), the Verband der Automobilindustrie, (the Association of the Automobile
Industry, or VDA) and the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA).191
MNCs communicate through these associations with European regulators, such as the
EEVC, because of the culture of the European Union. However, one U.S. auto executive speaks
of the “charm” Americans have to Europeans. American’s directness makes them interesting
and makes them someone they want to deal with.192 Therefore, some U.S. MNCs operating in
Europe still approach the EU’s bureaucracies and European governments through a one-on-one
approach, along with the European approach of collective action. According to executives at one
automotive manufacturer, informing bureaucracies like the EEVC is the primary purpose of the
government relations department. They must help regulators understand data and inform the
debate on regulations.193 Therefore, government relations are “a complicated balancing act.” 194
While the EEVC was the leading actor for automotive safety negotiations and regulations, in
1997 the EEVC created Working Group 12 (WG-12). WG-12 was placed in charge of sideimpact regulations and therefore worked most closely with the U.S. domestic actor, NHTSA,
throughout the discussions and research.195

The Process
In 1996, Congress issued NHTSA the directive to research the benefits of harmonizing
the U.S. and European regulations of side-impact and front crash tests. Research and
consultations between the United States and the European Union began in 1997, chiefly led by
NHTSA and the EEVC’s WG-12. The U.S. regulation from 1972 focused on the protection of
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the upper body in side-impact and frontal crashes. Meanwhile the newly instated European
regulation focused on different aspects of the passenger’s safety, like the protection from lower
body injuries, which had been overlooked by NHTSA. Congress believed NHTSA could learn
from the new European regulation and harmonize the U.S. regulation to the European one as
they updated it.
Upon hearing of the Congressional directive, the European Union, the DG of Enterprise
and Industry and the EEVC were pleased to work with their U.S. counterparts in this step
towards the harmonization of an automotive safety regulation. It would benefit both political
units involved, it would benefit corporations operating in these political units and it would
benefit the transatlantic marketplace. Leaders of NHTSA traveled to Europe to work with the
EEVC and WG-12 and research the costs and benefits of the European regulation in comparison
with the U.S. regulation. The EEVC was in charge of conducting tests and creating the
legislation for automotive safety as part of a sub-department of the DG Enterprise and Industry.
In an effort to collaborate with not only their U.S. counterparts, but also their Japanese,
Australian and Canadian counterparts, the EEVC invited representatives from NHTSA, the
Japanese Ministry of Transport, Transport Canada, and the Federal Office of Road Safety in
Australia.196 Furthermore, the EEVC was committed to producing a regulation that would best
benefit automotive MNCs; therefore the EEVC invited industry representatives, and corporate
representatives to participate in the discussions and research of the regulation.197
In the assessment of the regulation and the discussions regarding the harmonization of the
regulation, data was used to support every argument. NHTSA provided the EEVC with data on
their side-impact and front crash test requirements. This data helped the EEVC asses the level of
the European regulation in comparison with the U.S. regulation.198 Throughout the assessment
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process, NHTSA worked closely with the EEVC and constantly updated their opinions and
proposals in their attempt to reach an outcome. NHTSA wanted the EEVC to alter aspects of its
regulation in order to incorporate aspects from the U.S. regulation. In essence, both political
units wanted each other to compromise. Ultimately NHTSA representatives “hoped that the
Europeans would improve existing component regulations when applicable, rather than develop
a new regulation with different specification and procedures.”199 NHTSA wanted specific
requirements in the European regulation, but the Europeans were unwilling to yield on certain
components of their regulation which gave a daunting prospect to the potential harmonization of
the regulation between the United States and the European Union.
During the negotiations and the assessment, a petition was presented to NHTSA by a
group of automotive associations in an attempt to steer NHTSA towards their desired
outcome.200 These associations were willing to meet with NHTSA and work side-by-side with
them in order to provide concrete data and analysis in an attempt to expedite the outcome of the
negotiations and to make the outcome more favorable to themselves. The petition explicitly
asked for NHTSA to consult with multiple governments throughout the process, as well as
automotive associations, manufacturers and consumer representatives.201 Despite the
associations’ best efforts and the submission of the petition, NHTSA ignored the details of the
petition and continued their research. While this petition is a small action in the course of the
negotiations, it represents the expressed desires of non-governmental actors and their intentions
to influence the final outcome of the process.
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The Outcome
The United States and the European Union collaborated in 1997 in an attempt to
harmonize their side-impact and front crash test regulations. Throughout the assessment and
discussions, domestic level actors worked closely together. NHTSA and the EEVC WG-12 were
the two leading domestic level actors throughout this process; however multiple nongovernmental actors were invited to participate in the process and sought to influence the
process, including MNCs, industry representatives and manufacturers from both political units.
As stated earlier, NHTSA and the EEVC had three options: they could harmonize their
individual regulations to match one another; the United States could add an amendment to their
existing regulation as they updated it that would be in harmony with the European regulation or
they could part ways and not harmonize their regulations at all. Each of these options had
benefits and consequences, and it was for NHTSA to decide which outcome would provide U.S.
constituents with the safest vehicles.
One of the largest obstacles to the 1997 discussions was that neither state was willing to
compromise enough in regards to their regulation, in order to achieve harmonization. This
failure to compromise was what ultimately killed all hopes of a positive outcome from the
research and discussion conducted in 1997. While NHTSA made the decision that the United
States would neither add an amendment harmonized with the European regulation nor harmonize
their regulation to match it, NHTSA and the EEVC continued to work together towards the goal
of harmonization of regulations in all areas of automotive safety. 202
The ultimate outcome of the assessment and discussions in 1997 was negative. In their
concluding report in 1999, NHTSA informed Congress that the U.S. regulation could not be
harmonized with the European regulation. NHTSA believed the EU regulation did not fulfill
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their crash test qualifications, since results showed injuries acquired with the European
regulation were avoided with the U.S. regulation. However, NHTSA did state that aspects of the
European regulation would be incorporated into a new updated U.S. regulation on side-impact
and frontal crash tests. This aspect of the 1999 report indicated that something was gained from
the years of cooperation and work between the two political units. This case illustrates how even
a negative outcome to an attempt at the harmonization of a regulation provided the transatlantic
community with something positive—the two political units learned from one another, which
could ultimately lead to future successful harmonization outcomes.
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Conclusions

Multinational corporations appear to have grown in power and influence over the past
two decades. Now these non-governmental institutions have branches around the world, and
interact with international governments on a regular basis. The presence of MNCs in politics
suggests an unprecedented level of influence in policy decision-making. The aims of this study
were to determine if MNCs do influence the outcomes of international trade negotiations.
Specifically, in this study I sought to determine the level and means of influence MNCs have on
the outcomes of international trade negotiations.
Cases examined for this study explored international negotiations between the United
States and the European Union pertaining to transatlantic economic issues and automotive safety
regulatory issues. The European Union is the world’s largest producer of automotive vehicles,
with and the United States a near second.203 Therefore the automotive industry is highly vital to
both economies and there have been multiple attempts to harmonize regulations, which serve as
non-tariff barriers, between the two states. For this reason, automotive corporations seek to
inform and influence policy makers in the various countries in which they operate, with the goal
of shaping outcomes of international negotiations.

Analysis
In both cases examined in this study, actors pushed for the harmonization of regulations.
The regulatory divergences between the United States and the European Union had created nontariff barriers to trade for large corporations operating in both marketplaces, limiting both
commerce and profits. The case study in Chapter Three consists of the 2005 international
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negotiations in Washington D.C., where European and U.S. international and domestic level
actors convened to discuss a variety of issues. The outcome of the 2005 negotiations was the
High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, which was a further step in the pursuit of the
harmonization of regulations since it created a way for all actors to address regulatory
divergences. The second case study in Chapter Four pertains to the 1997 European UnionUnited States negotiations on the potential harmonization of an automotive safety regulation.
The outcome of these negotiations was the negative decision of the domestic level actors to
harmonize the two states’ regulations.
Figure 1: Theoretical Model

After applying the theoretical model (Figure 1) developed in Chapter Two to the cases
examined in this study four significant patterns emerged in the results. Each of these patterns
explains a different attribute of the relationship between MNCs and the government throughout
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international negotiations. The first common pattern between the cases regards MNC presence
in international negotiations. The level of MNC activity before the negotiations started and
afterwards remained the same in both cases. As one automotive executive explains, large MNCs
are constantly interacting with government officials. In other words, “there is never a dull
day.”204 Second, in both cases, direct MNC presence in the negotiations is undocumented.
However, both cases indicate this may be because many corporate-government interactions occur
behind closed doors. This is where politicians can let their guard down and begin to negotiate.205
Specifically, GM interacted with the governments directly in one-on-one relationships they have
formed over time. However, these relationships appear to have flourished in private where they
are often difficult to document.
Third, it is evident there is indirect MNC presence throughout the international
negotiations examined. The MNCs examined in this study were often represented by a variety of
associations. These associations often represent a large group of automotive corporations or
like-minded corporations, interact with domestic level actors on behalf of their members, and
communicate the majority’s desired outcome to the domestic level actors. In the 2005
negotiations there were two dominant U.S. associations: the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
(TABD) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce were both present and highly active throughout
these negotiations.206 VW is a member of the TABD and therefore, the opinions of VW were
incorporated in the position the TABD advocated for at the negotiations. GM was a member of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce which advocated for the interests of all of its members with
domestic level actors. Therefore, while the presence of the MNCs themselves is not apparent,
domestic level actors conducting the negotiations clearly heard their desires through these
associations. At the 1997 negotiations MNC presence in 1997 was clear when MNCs and
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representative associations were invited to participate in the research and negotiations, and when
a group of associations submitted a petition to the National Highway Traffic and Safety
Association in order to convey their desires. The inclusion of associations in the negotiations,
allowed MNCs’ influence to be felt. Furthermore, some MNCs such as GM, contributed data to
the research in the hopes of achieving a harmonized safety regulation. 207 The petition submitted
by a group of associations represented the industry’s desired outcome of the negotiations. It
called for NHTSA to work further with a wide range of governments and with various industry
representatives in the hopes of agreeing to a harmonized regulation.208 In both cases it is evident
MNCs are present and active at international negotiations through the documentation of various
associations’ presence at the negotiations, which represent the opinions of their MNC members.
However, interviews conducted for this study provide indirect evidence that direct MNCgovernment interactions do occur.
The pattern of MNC presence in international negotiations also indicates the pattern of
cross-level interactions in the cases. Throughout the cases it is clear that MNCs from one state
interacted and attempted to influence the government of another state. In 2005, the TABD
represented VW, a foreign MNC in the United States. The TABD interacted with governmental
representatives from both the European Union and the United States while expressing the desires
of VW. In 1997, GM was actively present at the negotiations, working with both the European
Union and the United States representatives. These interactions indicate not only the presence
and influence of MNCs in international negotiations, but also cross-level interactions which are
examined in the causal model. Therefore, this first pattern in the analysis of the cases indicates
direct and indirect MNC presence in international negotiations and cross-level interactions
between MNCs and governmental representatives.
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Second, domestic structure proved to be a very significant factor in both cases. From the
results, I conclude the United States and the European Union are society-centered political units.
Therefore in both political units, “policy-formation corresponds to a model of pluralistic
government: social forces are well-organized and robust.”209 This indicates the society-centered
structure of the two political units is vital in determining if a MNC can influence international
negotiation outcomes. The domestic structure variable is important because it theoretically
explains why a MNC is able to interact with a government and therefore potentially influence
international negotiation outcomes. This result confirms the first attribute of hypothesis four
stated in Chapter Two: a society centered country will permit multinational corporations to be
successful at influencing international negotiations.

However, the second attribute of

hypothesis four: multinational corporations will be successful at influencing international
negotiations directly through governmental actors, is disproven. The first patterned result
discussed above indicates multinational corporations in society-centered countries influence
international negotiations both directly and indirectly. The domestic structure of the United
States and the European Union partially explains why MNCs interact with governments during
international negotiations.
The analysis of the domestic structure highlighted the third prominent pattern in the
results. While the domestic structure is important in determining why a MNC can interact with a
government, the results of this analysis indicates the culture of the political unit will play just as
important, if not more of, a role. Both political units examined in these cases were societycentered. Therefore, this explained why MNCs were able to interact with the both governments.
However this did not explain the requirement for a different approach to the government in each
state. In the United States, MNCs interact through direct one-on-one relationships which are
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developed over time and are often in private where politicians can listen and negotiate with
MNC representatives unobserved.210 In Europe MNCs operate collectively and interact
indirectly with the government through associations. However, VW does have the ear of the
German government, a strong force in the European Union, and uses this relationship.
Furthermore, the European collective action approach appears to remain with European MNCs
when they operate in the United States. This may partially be because, as one automotive
executive claims the U.S. government plays favorites between U.S. MNCs and foreign ones,
further illustrating the advantage of negotiations being conducted in an MNCs home country.211
These cultural differences between the United States and the European Union could be an
explanation for VW’s presence in the TABD and GMs direct approach at the 2005 summit.212
Each MNC did what was acceptable in their home country. The 2005 summit’s location in
Washington D.C. permitted U.S. corporations such as GM, to continue to conduct one-on-one
interactions with government representatives, providing GM with an advantage. One automotive
executive even claimed that, “GM has a much greater presence.”213 These results are consistent
with an aspect hypothesis one: if a MNC influences its home government, it is will be more
successful at influencing international negotiation outcomes; and an aspect of hypothesis two: if
a MNC influences its host government, then it will be less successful at influencing international
negotiation outcomes. This pattern indicates a MNC is more successful at communicating with
its home country’s government than its host country’s government. However, because of the
presence of both domestic and foreign MNCs in both international negotiations examined in this
study, it is difficult to determine which MNC was more influential throughout the international
negotiations.
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The cultural differences between the two states was less prevalent in 1997 in comparison
with the 2005 summit, since many U.S. corporations were forced to comply to the European
collective approach. However, while associations were present because of the European culture
of collective action, GM was present as an individual MNC as well. Their presence as an
individual MNC could be because their corporation often combines strategies of governmental
interactions when working in Europe. In Europe GM may interact with governmental
representatives one-on-one and through associations, both of which were used during the 1997
negotiations. Overall this pattern illustrates the importance of a state’s culture, alongside the
importance of the domestic structure
The fourth pattern in the results was the omission of international level actors in both
international negotiations. This indicates the specificity of the negotiations and therefore that
actors with an expertise on the topic were required to lead the negotiations. These actors were
domestic level actors, and in both instances governmental bureaucracies. The 2005
harmonization negotiations were led by domestic level actors, specifically the representatives of
the governmental bureaucracies the Office of Budget and Management and the Directorate
General of Enterprise and Industry. It is clear that international level actors played a very
minimal role in these negotiations and the interactions between the two levels were infinitesimal.
However, while domestic level actors led the negotiations, international level actors officially
issued the Initiative to Enhance Transatlantic Economic Integration and Growth, which created
the Forum.214 In contrast to the 2005 summit, there were no international level actors present at
the 1997 negotiations. The negotiations were undertaken because a U.S. domestic level actor—
Congress—issued a directive.

Furthermore, domestic level actors who specialize in the area of

automotive safety regulations—NHTSA and the European Enhanced Vehicle Safety

81
Committee—were the actors leading these negotiations. The lack of international level actors in
both cases examined in this study indicates that topic-specific negotiations are often led by
domestic level actors with an expertise on the issue at hand rather than international level actors.
From the analysis of the cases examined throughout this study, there were four patterns
which emerged. First, it is evident MNCs are often present at negotiations that will affect their
sector of the economy and their bottom lines. However, associations were much more present at
negotiations than individual MNCs. Second, the domestic structure is highly important. It
determines why a MNC can interact with the government at home and abroad throughout
international negotiations. Third, U.S. and European culture is an important aspect in
determining how MNCs interact with governments at home and abroad and must be
acknowledged alongside a state’s domestic structure. Fourth, the lack of international level
actors illustrates that topic-specific negotiations are handled at the domestic level where the
actors are better versed in the details.
Therefore, I conclude MNCs were present in the international negotiations examined and
they did attempt to influence the outcomes. In 2005 the outcome was the High Level Regulatory
Cooperation Forum. The Forum reflected the desires of the MNCs for further harmonization of
regulations. Furthermore, it was designed to include representatives from the impacted
economic sectors in any future negotiations. In 1997, the outcome of the negotiations was a
negative response to the question of harmonization. This outcome was not in line with the
MNCs desired outcomes expressed by the associations at the negotiations or the petitions
submitted. These outcomes show that while MNCs are present throughout international
negotiations and do attempt to influence the outcome of these negotiations; their attempts to do
so may not always be successful.
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Lessons for Theory
After conducting an analysis of the cases surveyed in this study and seeing the patterns in
the results, there were several aspects that could not be explained by the theoretical literature
surveyed in Chapter One. Therefore, it is evident there is a dearth of literature on major
corporations’ impact on the outcome of international trade negotiations. Numerous theories
examine the role of MNCs in international negotiations and each offers its own explanation of
MNC presence. In Chapter One, I examined the most pertinent theories to international
negotiations: Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory, Jeffrey Knopf’s three-and-three theory
and Gourevitch and Katzenstein’s domestic structure theory.215 While these theories provide
theoretical explanations for the prominent patterns in the results, there are areas they fail to
explain. Therefore, I propose to modify the dominant theory, Putnam’s two-level game theory,
to make it more applicable to topic-specific negotiations international negotiations occurring in
the modern era. Furthermore, I will discuss the questions the results of this study raise about
Knopf’s three-and-three theory and Gourevitch and Katzenstein’s domestic structure theory.
Robert Putnam’s two-level game theory provides a well-constructed theoretical approach
to understanding international negotiations. It was the first theory of its kind to account for both
international and domestic level actors in international negotiations and therefore it explains
aspects of the cases surveyed. However, because of the results of the cases surveyed, I propose
three modifications to Putnam’s theory. These modifications will extend upon Putnam’s good
work, but will account for topic-specific international negotiations and the growing power of
non-governmental actors such as MNCs. I first propose a modification to the leadership of the
international level actors in international negotiations. One of the patterns in the analysis of the
cases surveyed in this study showed the omission of international level actors in topic-specific
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international negotiations. Therefore, it is evident international negotiations will not always be
led by international level actors and the head of government as proposed in Putnam’s work.
Rather, topic-specific negotiations such as the ones surveyed in both cases will be led by
domestic level actors with an expertise on the topic. This requires that two-level game theory be
modified to account for topic-specific negotiations where the domestic level actors will lead the
negotiations, rather than international level actors. This modification would then provide a
theoretical explanation for the pattern of the omission of international level actors in both the
2005 and the 1997 negotiations.
The second modification I propose is to the definition of domestic level actors and the
acknowledgement of the level of influence non-governmental domestic level actors possess.
Putnam includes non-governmental actors within his definition of the domestic level; however he
fails to specify which non-governmental actors would be present. Specifically, Putnam
accounted for MNCs presence through associations and interest groups, not through direct
interactions at international negotiations. The analysis of the cases indicates that MNCs do
interact with the government through associations; however they also interact with the
government through direct one-on-one relationships. Therefore, in order to theoretically
understand the presence of MNCs in international negotiations, I propose to modify Putnam’s
definition of domestic level actors and account for MNCs as their own category of nongovernmental actors at the domestic level. This modification will update two-level game theory
and account for present international negotiations where MNCs play a direct and influential role.
The third modification I suggest is to idea of win-sets that accompanies Putnam’s twolevel game theory. Putnam’s idea of win-sets is accurate when applied to traditional international
negotiations where the international level actors are dominant and lead the international
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negotiations, but must still interact with domestic level actors. However, the results of the cases
surveyed in this study indicate that at topic-specific international negotiations, domestic level
actors are dominant and lead the negotiations, while international level actors have a minimal
role. Furthermore, in modern topic-specific international negotiations there is a wider array of
non-governmental domestic level actors. These non-governmental actors constrain the options
available to the domestic level actors leading the negotiations and contribute to determining a
win-set within the domestic level. Therefore, I propose to modify Putnam’s idea of win-sets to
include a separate win-set within the domestic level. This win-set would be the possible
outcomes the governmental and non-governmental domestic level actors would agree upon and
therefore the outcomes that could potentially be ratified by the governmental domestic level
actors. The modification to include this win-set would acknowledge the powerful influence nongovernmental actors possess over governmental actors within the domestic level, especially over
elected governmental actors. Putnam’s two level game theory provides well thought out and
accurate theoretical explanations for international negotiations. However, with these three
modifications, Putnam’s theory would be better equipped to theoretically explain topic-specific
international negotiations occurring today.
Jeffrey Knopf’s three-and-three theory offers a theoretical explanation for the presence of
non-governmental domestic level actors including MNCs, in international negotiations. In the
development of his theory, Knopf acknowledged the failure of Putnam’s theory to account for
the influence of non-governmental domestic level actors in international negotiations. Within
Knopf’s three-and-three theory, his cross-level interaction component accurately accounts for the
presence and influence of non-governmental domestic level actors from one state on the other
state’s governmental actors. This aspect of Knopf’s theory explains the cross-level interaction
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pattern indicated throughout the cases. However, Knopf’s theory also predicts that one state’s
governmental actors will attempt to influence the other state’s non-governmental actors. The
results of this study challenge this idea and Knopf’s combination of both forms of cross-level
interactions into one. This posits the question of whether or not cross-level interactions should
be broken into two different categories. Should this occur, the first would consist of State I’s
non-governmental influencing State II’s governmental actors and the second would consist of
State I’s governmental actors influencing State II’s non-governmental actors. By separating the
two different cross-level interactions, three-and-three theory would be applicable to a wider array
of international negotiations.
Second, the results of this study also question Knopf’s trans-governmental interaction
component. Knopf’s trans-governmental connections could accurately explain why
governmental bureaucracies from two states work together in international negotiations to
achieve a specific outcome. However, this component claims these interactions only occur when
a state is internally divided, and therefore like-minded factions of the government will work
together to achieve a specific outcome from the negotiations. However, this is not what is
indicated in the results of this study. Rather, the results indicate governmental bureaucracies
work together not because the states are internally divided and are seeking to pursue one
outcome contrary to the rest of the state, but they work together because they are experts on the
topic of the negotiations and are often leading the negotiations. This suggests that like-minded
factions work together as the leaders of topic-specific international negotiations and questions
whether or not Knopf’s theory can account for international negotiations similar to those
surveyed in this study as well as international negotiations where the state is internally divided.
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Gourevitch and Katzenstein’s domestic structure theory provides a theoretical
explanation for why MNCs interact differently with the different governments in the various
states in which they operate; however it does not go far enough. The domestic structure of a
political unit is a vital factor. However, the results of this study indicate that despite the political
units possessing the same domestic structure, MNCs still interacted differently with
governmental officials in each political unit. This difference is because of the culture of each
political unit, a factor which is not accounted for in the domestic structure theory.
The pattern of MNC and government interactions in the results of this study raises
questions about the domestic structure theory. The pattern questions if the domestic structure
theory goes far enough to fully explain the various MNC-government interactions found in
international negotiations. The results of this study indicate there are two approaches for MNCs
to use in order to interact with the government and they are informed by the culture of the
political unit: they are direct and indirect approaches. The direct approach consists of one-onone interactions between non-governmental and governmental actors. The results of this study
indicate the United States is a society-centered direct approach political unit. Therefore, nongovernmental actors such as MNCs, will interact with the U.S. government directly more so than
they do indirectly. The indirect approach consists of MNCs or other non-governmental actors
interacting with the government through intermediary actors such as associations. The results
indicate the European Union is a society-centered indirect approach political unit. Therefore,
non-governmental actors will interact with the European Union collectively through associations.
Furthermore, these results offer an explanation for why a non-governmental actor from an
indirect approach culture, will continue to interact with a government this way, in spite of it
being a direct approach government. The culture of their home state will still inform the way
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they interact. This illustrates the importance of a state’s culture and the importance of a MNC’s
home state’s culture. Furthermore, the role of culture questions if the domestic structure theory
provides a thorough enough theoretical explanation of MNC-government interactions or if it
must go further to explain the influence of non-governmental actors in international negotiations.
The theoretical literature discussed in Chapter One is a solid theoretical basis to use in the
analysis of international negotiations. However, there is a discontinuity between the theoretical
literature and aspects of the results of this study. Therefore, I propose a modification to
Putnam’s two-level game theory. This modification will explain aspects of international
negotiations that are currently overlooked and will make it applicable to topic-specific
international negotiations occurring today with the new powerful actors that have emerged
throughout the past decades. The results of this study also raise questions about Knopf’s threeand-three theory and domestic structure theory. These questions suggest that these two theories
could benefit from further development.

Suggestions for Further Research
The primary focus of my research was the influence of MNCs on international
negotiation outcomes in two instances of negotiations between the European Union and the
United States. In order to gather my research I examined documents from and about the
negotiations in question. These documents provided me with the basis of my cases documenting
the activities at the negotiations and indirect MNC interaction with the governments through
associations’ presence at the negotiations. Meanwhile, while most direct interactions between
MNCs and governmental officials are private, I uncovered these interactions by conducting
interviews with automotive executives at the two corporations I specifically focused on
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throughout my research. These interviews provided me with valuable information that helped
develop my case studies and fill in the gaps were interactions had not been documented. In order
to further my research, I would have liked to conduct more interviews with a wider range of
participants from the corporations I focused on in this study. Furthermore, I would have liked to
include interviews with governmental officials who were present at the international negotiations
discussed in the cases surveyed in this study.
Along with the two case studies I developed throughout this study, I believe my study
would have benefited from the inclusion of more case studies. Specifically, I would like to have
included cases that examine society-centered versus state-centered states in international
negotiations, since neither of the states examined in my cases are state centered. The inclusion
of cases such as this would have allowed me to answer further questions on MNC influence on
international negotiations in a wider array of circumstances and it would have allowed me to
provide more conclusive results on the role of domestic structure in international trade
negotiations. In addition to this study that was complete in a specified amount of time, if I had
more time I would have liked to expand my study to incorporate international negotiations that
pertain to a wider array of issues and industries. Along with my current research, these further
cases would provide my study with further data and therefore make the patterns already apparent
in my results more vivid. These expansions of case material would make my results even more
generalizable to more circumstances in international politics.
Many scholars have researched the presence and influence of external actors on
international negotiations. In this study I sought to determine if MNCs influence the outcomes
of international trade negotiations through their presence at the negotiations and their interactions
with governmental officials. In order to examine if my hypotheses were true, I conducted two
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case studies on international trade negotiations between the United States and the European
Union. The results show that MNCs are present at international trade negotiations and they do
influence the outcomes of international trade negotiations. Furthermore, the results indicate
there are gaps in the existing theoretical literature, and therefore I propose a modification to
Putnam’s dominant two-level game theory. Overall, this research shows the growing presence of
non-governmental actors in our political system, and it could be applied to current international
trade negotiations.
International trade negotiations occur every day and involve non-governmental actors,
domestic level actors and international level actors. The integration of the global economy and
international politics makes international trade negotiations fascinating to research and all the
more important to understand in today’s world. An example of the constant evolution of
international trade negotiations is President Obama’s announcement in his 2013 State of the
Union Address. In February Obama announced, “we will launch talks on a comprehensive
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union, because trade that is
fair and free across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying American jobs.”216 The
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership would go beyond simple international trade
negotiations. Through these negotiations the Europe Union and the United States could, “expect
to align their regulations regarding manufacturing and services.”217 Furthermore, this agreement
would have major positive implications for automotive production in both political units, where
corporations have been compensating for various non-tariff barriers for decades.218 According to
one expert, the true gains from this agreement would include regulatory cooperation where
transatlantic businesses would flourish, for example in the automotive industry.219 The support
of both political units and non-governmental actors for the agreement illustrates the importance
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of free trade in the transatlantic economy and the harmonization of regulations within the
transatlantic marketplace occurring today.
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Appendix A: Potential Interview Questions


When does your company become most interactive with the government or would you
say you are always at the same level?



When there are specific negotiations occurring that pertain to the auto industry, does the
company take notice and communicate with representatives active in the government?
Can you think of any specific instances where this has happened?



Does your government relations department ever purposefully try to sway politicians to a
different outcome? Are there more and less effective ways to do so?



How would you say the government affects your company and how it operates? Does
this differ between at home and abroad?



Does your company structure things differently in order to maintain better relations with
the abroad government? And if so how?



In your opinion, is it easier to communicate with your home government and what is the
relationship like with your home government when it is compared with the one with your
host government?



What channels do you think provide your company with the best and most dynamic
communication with the home and host government? Does this depend on the
government with which you are interacting?



The United States and the EU discuss a lot regarding the auto industry. Since the United
States and EU differ so much in their safety standards, what is your company’s opinion
on this and what would you want to see happen?



The United States and the EU have moved closer towards a more regulated system of
trade with numerous institutions in place to ease the process. Are you pleased with this
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process and would your company be pleased if this path of cooperation ultimately led to a
free trade agreement?
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